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7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we examine the implications of a neighborhood system of
public schooling and compare it to provision that allows districtwide open
enrollment or choice. We also contrast these policy regimes with the most
decentralized form of direct public educational provision, in which neigh-
borhoods constitute their own school districts. This study is part of a re-
search agenda that investigates school choice and ﬁnance policies. We be-
gin by outlining our research ﬁndings to date in order to place the results
developed below in the broader context of our conception of alternative ed-
ucational policies and their consequences.
Our research emphasizes diﬀerences in attributes of students and their
households (especially in student ability and household income), peer
groups in schools and in the classroom, equilibrium sorting of types of stu-
dents within the schooling system, and the consequences for school quali-
ties and the distribution of educational beneﬁts. Although variation in
schooling expenditure plays a role, because schooling quality is substan-
tially determined by student peer groups, we ﬁnd that signiﬁcant hetero-
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ence Foundation, and MacArthur Foundation, with our gratitude.geneity in schools and outcomes results even under policies that equalize ﬁ-
nance or if expenditure variation has small eﬀects.
In our research, we have developed a theoretical model of students and
their households and of related educational institutions that makes simple
assumptions. For example, we presume that households with a school-age
child obtain higher utility as their child’s educational achievement in-
creases, and attendance at a higher-quality school increases that achieve-
ment. Our model is detailed below. Our intent in focusing on simple char-
acteristics in developing the model is to allow the ﬂexibility to analyze the
variety of educational policy alternatives that exist and have been proposed.
Given a policy regime, we predict consequences for schooling qualities and
educational outcomes. We quantify and illustrate these predictions with a
computational model that complements the theoretical model. The com-
putational model speciﬁes functional forms for components of the model
like the household utility function, and its parameters are calibrated to a va-
riety of empirical ﬁndings.
Most of the theoretical components of our model are part of received
theory. However, we must make assumptions about what the crucial ele-
ments of the educational process are, including assumptions about issues
lacking deﬁnitive empirical evidence, and, in calibrating the computational
model, we can rely only on the best available estimates. The most important
of these assumptions we make is that a student’s educational achievement
is inﬂuenced by the student’s peer group in school. For these reasons, it is
important that predictions of the model be tested. Although Epple, Figlio,
and Romano (forthcoming) provide evidence that supports the basic
model, more such testing remains to be done. We focus on developing pre-
dictions in this chapter.
Our research predicts that the nature of student sorting into schools and
the consequences for school qualities and educational outcomes are dra-
matically inﬂuenced by public policy. This is illustrated by the three panels
of ﬁgure 7.1, which depict student sorting into schools under three diﬀerent
policy regimes. Abstracting from detail that is developed later in the chap-
ter, our model characterizes households as having exogenous income (y)
and one student with ability level denoted b. Households value the educa-
tional achievement of their child, which rises with the quality of the school
attended and the child’s own ability. School quality is determined at least in
part by the distribution of student ability in the school, with higher-ability
students improving school quality for all through a peer-group eﬀect.
Higher-income households are willing to pay more for increases in their
child’s educational achievement and hence are willing to pay more for in-
creases in the quality of their child’s school. The set of households is char-
acterized by a joint distribution over income and ability, which we will
usually assume to exhibit positive correlation (for several reasons to be
discussed).
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Fig. 7.1 A, Admission spaces with no voucher; B, admission spaces with a ﬂat-rate
per-student voucher of $4,200 (all private schools); C, admission spaces for a neigh-
borhood school systemThe panels of ﬁgure 7.1 show how the “type space of students,” that is,
the ability-income plane, is partitioned into schools in equilibrium under
three diﬀerent policy regimes. In each of these cases there is only one (large)
school district, or a single political jurisdiction, that determines educational
expenditure per student in public schools. In panel A, there is open enroll-
ment in the public sector, meaning that students may choose any (free)
public school so long as they live in the district, and there is a competitive
(free entry) private sector. In equilibrium, here public schools are homoge-
neous and serve a large population consisting of relatively nonaﬄuent and
lower-ability students, those that make up the triangle with vertex at the
origin. The upper diagonal lines, which we call “boundary loci,” delineate
the student bodies of four private schools that arise in the equilibrium. The
private school that serves the most aﬄuent and highest-ability set of stu-
dents is of highest quality, due to its having the highest-ability peer group
(and perhaps higher per-student expenditure). The private schools as one
moves southwest in panel A decline in quality, but all are of higher quality
than the homogeneous public-sector schools. Private schools charge tuition
that varies with ability and, to some extent, with income. Private schools
give tuition discounts to higher-ability students because they increase the
quality of the school through the peer-group eﬀect on education, thus al-
lowing the school to charge everyone higher tuition. Very high ability stu-
dents may pay zero tuition or receive fellowships. The discounting to abil-
ity combined with increased demand for quality with income leads to a
cross-subsidization within schools from the relatively higher-income and
lower-ability students to the opposite types of students—hence the parti-
tion with downward-sloping boundary loci. As either income or ability it-
self increases, students ﬁnd themselves in better schools. We refer to the lat-
ter respectively as income and ability stratiﬁcation. Students must be of
suﬃciently high income or ability (or some combination) to ﬁnd themselves
in a private school.
Panel B depicts an equilibrium with only private schools serving students.
Such a system would obviously arise if public policy provides no public op-
tion, but it also would arise if all households have access to a voucher of
magnitude equal to at least average school cost. In the latter case, no stu-
dents choose the public option. Private schools behave as in panel A, the
diﬀerence being that there are many private schools and a wider distribu-
tion of schooling qualities. The diﬀerences in peer groups and school qual-
ities between students near the origin and far out in the ability-income plane
are substantial.
Panel C depicts an equilibrium with no private schools (as if they are ille-
gal or unable to cover their costs), but with the single district divided into
small neighborhoods, each of which has its own school. Here, public policy
requires that a household send its child to school in the neighborhood in
which the household resides. This equilibrium presumes, as could be in the
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of student ability but that household income and student ability are posi-
tively correlated. Although per-student expenditure is the same across the
schools since this is within one district, the income stratiﬁcation and in-
come-ability correlation lead to a hierarchy of public school qualities via
the peer eﬀect. The quality hierarchy is supported by rising housing prices
across neighborhoods with school qualities, and selection of higher-income
households into neighborhoods with better schools. Although it appears
that households are stratiﬁed only by income in panel C, average student
ability rises as neighborhoods become more wealthy due to the correlation
between income and ability.
We see that the three policy regimes have substantially diﬀerent predic-
tions about the equilibrium allocation. These three policy alternatives
vividly illustrate that the eﬀects of school choice policies vary dramatically
with the speciﬁcs of the policy. Panel A presumes open enrollment in the
public sector, or that there is public-school choice. Panel B corresponds to
a universal voucher system with vouchers of suﬃcient magnitude that
everyone chooses a private school. There are many other “choice policies,”
several of which are discussed later, also with diﬀerent predicted outcomes.
It bears emphasis that school choice policies can be expected to have (some-
times) radically diﬀerent implications for equilibrium provision of school-
ing, a theme of this paper and volume.
From a research standpoint, diﬀerences in predictions across educational
policies provide a means to test the model: Although both a neighborhood
schooling regime and private schooling are associated with income stratiﬁ-
cation across schools, only the latter exhibits ability stratiﬁcation for given
income. Hence, for example, our model predicts that vouchers or lower en-
try barriers on private schools will increase ability stratiﬁcation.
Detailed analysis of the regimes in panels A and B are in Epple and Ro-
mano (1998, 1999). Epple and Romano (1998) develop the analysis with no
vouchers and with ﬂat-rate (or universal) vouchers. Epple and Romano
(1999) investigate voucher design, allowing vouchers to be conditioned on
student attributes and, perhaps, characteristics of the school attended. In
this chapter we develop properties and attendant predictions of the equilib-
rium that is depicted in panel C, as well as investigating the eﬀects of a
public-school choice policy.1We will also in section 7.6 return to a more de-
tailed comparison of neighborhood public schooling provision to voucher-
induced private provision.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section motivates our study of
neighborhood schooling and public-school choice, provides an overview of
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1. Epple, Newton, and Romano (2002) investigate the equilibrium causes and consequences
of ability tracking in schools, hence the interaction of sorting of students within and across
schools.the related results, and discusses related literature. Section 7.3 presents the
theoretical model, and section 7.4 develops the theoretical predictions.
Section 7.5 details the computational analysis, including normative find-
ings. Section 7.6 further contrasts the neighborhood equilibrium with the
private-provision alternative. Section 7.7 draws conclusions. Some of the
more technical analysis is in the appendix.
7.2 Neighborhood Schooling, the Choice Movement, and an Overview
Public education in the United States is increasingly characterized by
centralized ﬁnance but with schools determined by neighborhood of resi-
dence. Within jurisdictions, households frequently may choose among
neighborhoods in which to reside and send their children to school, but
with limited opportunity to choose alternative tax-expenditure schooling
packages. In 1998, nine states had school districts that were coterminous
with counties or very nearly so, and the ratio of school districts to counties
was 2 or below in four more states.2 Since counties are relatively large geo-
graphic entities, county districts are typically multischool districts. More-
over, these thirteen states do not include a number of states that have the
lowest variation among districts in expenditure per student due to relatively
centralized ﬁnance systems. Examples are Delaware, Colorado, and Cali-
fornia, whose ratios of 95th percentile to 5th percentile district expendi-
tures in 1994 were, respectively, 1.26, 1.31, and 1.34.3 Although uneven and
of limited success, a central theme in educational ﬁnance reform over the
last several decades has been expenditure equalization.4 For example, the
same district expenditure ratios in 1972 for the three states just mentioned
were, respectively, 1.81, 1.61, and 1.95.5 Most students live in districts with
multiple schools: In 1993–94, 91 (66) percent of elementary- (high-)school
students lived in districts with multiple elementary (high) schools (U.S. De-
partment of Education 1994). Although there is a growing trend toward
centralization of ﬁnance in the United States, centralization of ﬁnance is al-
232 Dennis Epple and Richard Romano
2. The ﬁrst nine states are Hawaii, Maryland, West Virginia, Nevada, Florida, Louisiana,
Georgia, Virginia, and North Carolina, and the second four states are Tennessee, Utah, Al-
abama, and Mississippi. These data are from the Common Core of Data for 1998.
3. These calculations use data from the Census of Governments for 1972 and the Common
Core of Data for 1994. The ratios for these years have been calculated for forty-ﬁve states, ex-
cluding Hawaii (whose ratio is 1), Alaska, Arkansas, Montana, and Vermont. Districts are
nonuniﬁed in the latter three states and were exempted from the calculations. Special thanks
to David Figlio for providing access to his database.
4. See Gold, Smith, and Lawton (1995) for state-by-state description of their school ﬁnance
system and summary of reforms and initiatives.
5. Among the forty-ﬁve states for which calculations were made (see footnote 3), the change
from 1972 to 1994 of the 95th percentile to 5th percentile district expenditure ratio exceeded
10 percent (of the 1972 ratio) in eighteen states. In sixteen of these states the ratio declined. The
exceptions are Maine and Missouri. See Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1998) for evidence that
court cases have substantially reduced expenditure inequality.ready well established in many other countries (Benabou 2000). Analysis of
the provision of education using a standard Tiebout model with commu-
nity-level ﬁnance of education is inappropriate in such settings. One pur-
pose of this chapter is to examine neighborhood formation and schooling
provision when no choice among political jurisdictions is practical but
choice among neighborhoods within the jurisdiction can be exercised. Here
any neighborhood sorting of households and variation in school quality
that result are driven solely by peer-group eﬀects.
As school ﬁnance is under reform in the United States, a school choice
movement is gaining momentum.6 Choice policies and proposals include
inter- and intradistrict open enrollment, formation of magnet and charter
schools, and vouchers for private schools. The United States is by no means
at the forefront of this movement. For example, broad school choice re-
forms were adopted in the United Kingdom in the early 1980s. It remains
to be seen how the school choice movement will evolve, but it seems likely
that some form or forms of increased school choice will play a role in the fu-
ture. Another purpose of this chapter is to investigate the eﬀects of public-
school choice. We examine the consequences of elimination of territorial
(neighborhood) restrictions on school attendance in our model, with and
without friction in the exercise of school choice.7
We develop a theoretical and complementary computational model to
study equilibria in the aforementioned policy regimes, with attention to the
distribution of educational beneﬁts. School quality is presumed to depend
both on per-student educational expenditure and on the makeup of the stu-
dent body, the latter measured by mean student ability. Households diﬀer
continuously by income and student ability, with normal demand for edu-
cational quality. The economy is made up of an exogenous number of neigh-
borhoods, each having a school and with given housing supply. Households
choose in which neighborhood to reside and where to send their child to
school as constrained by policy, and vote over the economy’s tax expendi-
ture package. With neighborhood schooling, students must attend school
in their neighborhood of residence. With choice, students may attend
school in another neighborhood, which may or may not entail a private
(transportation) cost. We also compare these equilibria to that of the tradi-
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6. Probably the biggest recent story is Florida’s statewide voucher program for students in
failing public schools introduced in the 1999–2000 academic year. However, there are a myr-
iad of choice programs and initiatives. See Rees (2000) for a recent state-by-state summary.
7. The U.S. Department of Education National Center for Educational Statistics (1996) es-
timated that 13.8 percent of U.S. school districts had intradistrict open enrollment policies and
28.6 percent of districts were subject to interdistrict open enrollment policies in 1993–94. Par-
ticipation of students subjected to the respective policies was 24.5 percent and 1.6 percent re-
spectively. The estimated rate of “participation” in intradistrict policies must be interpreted
with care, because some programs require households to choose their school, with then 100
percent participation rate. More generally, programs diﬀer in limitations and requirements.
See Rees (2000) for details and sources for more information.tional Tiebout environment, where neighborhoods provide schooling only
to their residents, who then also collectively determine their neighbor-
hood’s tax-expenditure package.
The main predictions are as follows. Neighborhood schooling is enough
to lead to stratiﬁed equilibrium and a school-quality hierarchy if ability and
income are positively correlated or if demand for school quality rises with
student ability. Thus, a stratiﬁed outcome typically arises even though there
is no variation in per-student expenditure across schools. Why? Peer stu-
dent abilities are a key determinant of school quality in our model. Thus,
households who demand higher school quality will pay a housing price pre-
mium to live in neighborhoods with schools having a higher-ability student
peer group. If demand for educational quality rises with income, as we as-
sume, then households will stratify by income across schools, with higher-
income households occupying neighborhoods with higher-quality schools.
This income sorting in turn sustains the school quality hierarchy via the
positive correlation between income and student ability. If demand for
school quality also rises with ability, as in some speciﬁcations we consider,
equilibrium continues to be characterized by a hierarchy of school qualities,
and there is stratiﬁcation by both income and ability across the school hier-
archy.
The equilibrium described in the preceding paragraph is supported by
housing prices that ascend across neighborhoods in the same order as
school quality. If we introduce intradistrict choice across public schools and
there are no costs of exercising this choice (e.g., if transportation costs are
paid by the government), then schooling qualities will be equalized in equi-
librium. With the linkage between residence and school severed, housing
prices cannot ration access to higher-quality schools. Equilibrium is char-
acterized by equal-quality schools, each with the same student peer groups,
and no housing price diﬀerences across neighborhoods. There are also sec-
ondary eﬀects on the equilibrium school expenditure level, and results vary
some when costs of exercising choice are present, as we will later show.
The (former) single-district equilibrium with neighborhood schools of
diﬀerent qualities is comparable to another no-choice policy in which
neighborhoods constitute their own districts that individually select school
tax-expenditure levels. Although this alternative does lead to diﬀerences in
expenditure levels across neighborhoods, it does not alter much (if at all) the
sorting of households and students into neighborhoods and schools. Given
that peer eﬀects are important, what is fundamental to sorting into neigh-
borhoods and schools is a residence requirement for school placement,
which characterizes both a single-district neighborhood system and a mul-
tidistrict local-ﬁnance system. An implication that we emphasize is that ex-
penditure equalization, a popular reform intended to equalize schooling
quality, will itself fail miserably to “equalize” peer groups and thus school
qualities (given the importance of peer eﬀects). Moreover, we will provide
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districts is extreme.
School choice engendered by a universal and laissez-faire voucher system
with vouchers of suﬃcient magnitude that all schooling is provided pri-
vately also eliminates any role that residence has on school attendance.
However, such a voucher system is predicted to yield a highly stratiﬁed equi-
librium, much closer to the multidistrict public equilibrium than to the
single-district, public-school choice equilibrium. Here the market will pro-
vide households with what they want, given their incomes (and the voucher
supplement), while rewarding student ability because it is an input to edu-
cational quality through the peer eﬀect. Higher-income households with
lower-ability students will buy their way into private schools by supple-
menting the voucher. Higher-ability students, whether of high or low in-
come, will be drawn into private schools with tuition subsidies provided by
schools on top of the voucher, including fellowships in some cases. The re-
sult will be an equilibrium stratiﬁed by both income and ability across
schools (but not neighborhoods), with more ability stratiﬁcation than un-
der the no-choice, public-schooling equilibria because of the latitude of the
private schools to use ﬁnancial aid to attract higher-ability students. As will
be discussed further, limits on the practices of private schools that may be
associated with alternative voucher systems can radically alter the predicted
allocation. This is but another example of the truism “all choice programs
are not alike.”
Before turning to the analysis, we comment brieﬂy on related literature.
Our analysis is in the tradition of multicommunity models of local public
good provision begun by Tiebout (1956).8 A number of papers study provi-
sion of public education in such a framework, including Inman (1978), de
Bartolome (1990, 1997), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Benabou (1993,
1996), Silva and Sonstelie (1995), Durlauf (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson
(1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998), and Nechyba (1999, 2000). Central to our
model are peer eﬀects, which play a role only in de Bartolome (1990), Ben-
abou (1993, 1996), Durlauf (1996), and Nechyba (1999, 2000) among the
latter list. Further narrowing the overlap, only Benabou (1993, 1996) has an
analogue to neighborhood provision of schooling within a jurisdiction.9 In
results similar to one of “our” ﬁndings, he shows that complementarities in
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8. See Ellickson (1971); Westhoﬀ (1977); Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984); Goodspeed
(1989); Epple and Romer (1991); Fernández (1997); Brueckner (2000); and the papers that fo-
cus on schooling discussed next.
9. Nechyba’s jurisdictions are divided into neighborhoods that diﬀer by their qualities of
housing, but public school students in all neighborhoods within a jurisdiction attend the same
school. Hence, he ﬁnds stratiﬁcation by income across neighborhoods within jurisdictions but
not across public schools within a jurisdiction. Stratiﬁcation in public schooling quality across
jurisdictions arises, however, including when there is statewide ﬁnance. In the latter case, the
role of a jurisdiction is similar to the role of a neighborhood in our paper, and school-quality
stratiﬁcation arises similarly.individual and group characteristics can lead to community stratiﬁcation
without expenditure diﬀerences. The models and emphasis diﬀer substan-
tially. Other related research is noted at various points during the chapter.
7.3 The Model
Each household has one child of ability b who will attend public school.
Household income is denoted y. The population of households is normal-
ized to one and characterized by joint probability density function f(b, y),
with f(b, y) continuous and strictly positive on its support S [bm, bx]  [y m,
y x]  R2
 . Whether income and ability are correlated in the population is im-
portant. To simplify, we assume that E[b|y] is either strictly increasing in y
or independent of y, implying either positive or zero correlation.
Household utility depends on numeraire and housing consumption, and
the educational achievement of the child denoted a. Every household con-
sumes exactly one unit of housing at price denoted p, the simple housing
market discussed further later. The student’s educational achievement de-
pends on the quality, q, of the school attended, and on the student’s ability:
a   a(q, b). School quality depends on per-student educational expendi-
ture in the school, X, and on the mean ability of the school’s peer group,
denoted  . The latter peer-group eﬀect in education is central to our model
and will be discussed further. Educational expenditure is ﬁnanced by a
proportional income tax, t. Given that a unit of housing is consumed, util-
ity is then given by U   U[y(1 – t) – p, a(q(X,  ), b)], with all functions







  increases with y.
In much of the analysis we employ a Cobb-Douglas utility-achievement
speciﬁcation:
(2) U   [y(1   t)   p]X   b ; q   X   ; a   qb ;  , ,  0.
The economy consists of N   {2, 3, . . .} neighborhoods, with exoge-
nously deﬁned boundaries and with one school in every neighborhood.
Each neighborhood has a backward-L housing supply, horizontal at mag-
nitude c until neighborhood land capacity is reached. Interpret c to be the
construction cost of a unit of housing, with each housing unit requiring one
lot of land. For now, assume the economy land capacity is exactly enough
to house the population. We oﬀer a more appealing interpretation later, but
it can introduce additional equilibria that we wish to avoid initially.
Households make a residence choice, choose a school for their child, and
participate in a vote over tax rates. The nature of these choices depends on
a binary policy parameter that we vary exogenously. The choice of school
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residence requirement implies that attendance is restricted to one’s neigh-
borhood school so that the school’s peer group corresponds to that of the
children of neighborhood residents. Of course, the absence of such a re-
quirement permits real school choice, and this is what we mean by a school-
choice or open-enrollment policy. We will consider the eﬀects of a school
choice policy with and without any frictions (costs of exercising choice).
As motivated above, we focus on the case in which school ﬁnance is cen-
tralized. A single income tax rate is determined by majority preference in
the entire economy here under centralized ﬁnance. Constant returns to
scale in schooling are assumed, implying that per-student expenditure in
the economy is invariant in this case. This conforms to cases with district-
level ﬁnance and large enough districts that nonschool factors determine
district choice, or to some cases with statewide ﬁnance.10 For purposes of
comparison, we will also examine the more traditional Tiebout public ﬁ-
nance problem with multiple political jurisdictions by assuming that neigh-
borhoods correspond to jurisdictions.
Equilibria are determined assuming the timing of activities summarized
in ﬁgure 7.2. In the ﬁrst stage, (atomistic) households make neighborhood
residence choices as price takers and the housing markets clear. Households
then choose a school, although a residence requirement renders this choice
a given. Voting over taxes takes place last, voters taking the (now commit-
ted) residences and schools as given.11 The model has a single period; no
real time elapses between the stages. Households correctly anticipate the
ensuing properties of equilibrium when making choices, of course.
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10. The model applies precisely to statewide ﬁnance if households are exogenously assigned
to regions (e.g., by employment opportunities), and regions are homogeneous with regard to
their distribution of household types and their neighborhoods’ housing supplies. Alterna-
tively, the model applies precisely if choice of neighborhood in the entire state is determined by
schooling. These are obviously very strong assumptions, but they are needed only to be con-
sistent with the model’s determination of voting equilibrium. Key results like stratiﬁcation
across neighborhoods require only that expenditure is constant across neighborhoods, and
then would hold for appropriately modiﬁed determination of voting equilibrium.
11. Perhaps surprisingly, if voting occurs in the second stage and school choice is last, all re-
sults below are correct as long as equilibrium exists under this alternative. This is because, for
one subset of cases we study, the exercise of choice does not vary with the tax; and, for the re-
maining cases, the preferred tax of voters is (locally) independent of anticipated variation in
the exercise of choice. The problem with the alternative timing is that existence of voting equi-
librium is not guaranteed in the latter cases, leading us to adopt the timing in ﬁgure 7.1. We de-
veloped the results with the alternative timing in an earlier version of this paper (Epple and Ro-
mano 1995) while simply assuming existence.
Fig. 7.2 Order of activities
Residence Choices  → Schools Chosen → Voting Over 
& Housing Markets  Proportional 
Clear Income TaxSome elements of the model warrant further discussion. School quality is
determined in part by a peer-group externality, which inﬂuences neighbor-
hood formation and school choice. Ability-based peer eﬀects in the class-
room are conﬁrmed by numerous studies, but this is not without contro-
versy.12This aspect of the model can be given a more generic interpretation.
Any household variable that positively aﬀects both the performance of the
child and the child’s school conforms to the model.13 Parental input in the
education process that entails both helping the child and the school is an ex-
ample. Parental input in the school might come in the form of direct par-
ticipation in education (e.g., classroom volunteer work) or in monitoring
and disciplining teachers and administrators.14 McMillan (2000) provides
evidence of positive parental eﬀects on school quality operating through
parent-teacher associations with parental involvement predicted by income
and educational level. For all these interpretations of household character-
istic b, it is likely to be positively correlated with parental educational at-
tainment, hence also with household income. We show when and why pos-
itive correlation between b and y is important. We will continue to refer to
b as student ability for expositional ease.15
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12. The inﬂuence of ability on own educational achievement is well documented and not
controversial (see Hanushek 1986). In the economics literature, Henderson, Mieszkowski, and
Sauvageau (1978); Summers and Wolfe (1977); Toma (1996); Zimmer and Toma (1999); Sac-
erdote (2000); and Hoxby (2000b) ﬁnd signiﬁcant peer group eﬀects. Evans, Oates, and
Schwab (1992) adjust for selection bias in the formation of peer groups and show that it elim-
inates the signiﬁcance of the peer group in explaining teenage pregnancy and dropping out of
school. They are careful to point out that their results should not be interpreted as suggesting
that peer group eﬀects do not exist, but that scientiﬁc demonstration of those eﬀects is inade-
quate. Note, too, that their work supports the notion that peer group variables enter the util-
ity function, because a selection process does take place. See also Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt
(2000). The psychology literature on peer group eﬀects in education also contains some con-
troversy. See Moreland and Levine (1992) for a survey that concludes: “The fact that good stu-
dents beneﬁt from ability grouping, whereas poor students are harmed by it, suggests that the
mean level of ability among classmates, as well as variability in their ability levels, could be an
important factor. The results from several recent studies . . . support this notion.”
Theoretical models of education that incorporate peer group eﬀects include Arnott and
Rowse (1987); Manski (1992); Eden (1992); Rothschild and White (1995); Epple, Newlon, and
Romano (2002); Epple and Romano (1998, 1999); and Caucutt (2002), in addition to the pa-
pers discussed in section 7.2.
13. In fact, many of the results are independent of b’s positive impact on the child’s own
achievement. This is so when the assumption in equation (3), presented below, holds.
14. The monitoring interpretation of the public school input suggests that teacher-
administrator contracts should reﬂect school quality. This interpretation of our model em-
braces the belief that in fact users of a school are the primary enforcers of (implicit) contracts,
and they vary in their ability and willingness to enforce them. McMillan (1999) develops a re-
lated theoretical model. For a study of the eﬀects of centralized versus decentralized school ﬁ-
nance systems on the eﬀectiveness of explicit incentive contracts with school administrators,
see Hoxby (1995).
15. We should also note that measuring the peer quality with the mean of b in the school is
less restrictive than it may appear. Relevant to the student ability interpretation, some re-
searchers have argued that reduced variation in ability in the classroom facilitates curriculum
specialization, thus improving the quality of instruction. Our model and qualitative results
generalize to measuring peer quality as the mean in the school of any increasing function h(b)That housing prices serve as screens to accessing neighborhoods is not
controversial (see Black 1999 and Barrow 1999). We think it is important to
introduce housing markets into the model, but have adopted a simple spec-
iﬁcation. We examine income taxation rather than property taxation so that
tax liabilities rise continuously with income. The model can be varied to ex-
amine property taxation, with results that are qualitatively the same.
7.4 School Policy and Equilibrium
7.4.1 Equilibrium with Neighborhood Schooling
This model applies whenever the political jurisdiction encompasses
multiple neighborhoods, each providing schooling for its own residents, if
household entry into and exit from the jurisdiction can reasonably be ig-
nored. This analysis also provides a basis for investigating cases with mul-
tiple districts consisting of multiple neighborhoods, as we discuss in the
concluding section. Toward developing the properties of equilibrium, note
ﬁrst that here the school choice stage is trivial, committed in the initial res-
idential choice stage. Providing conditions for and describing a voting equi-
librium are not problematic except for one minor issue. We must guarantee
that equilibrium permits everyone to purchase a house. Later we explicitly
address this issue and develop voting equilibrium properties for the case of
Cobb-Douglas preferences (equation [1]). For now, take as given the exis-
tence of a unique voting equilibrium in the third stage, with everyone able
to aﬀord a house. By deﬁnition, centralized ﬁnance implies a single tax rate
and X1   X2   ...     XN, where, here and henceforth, subscripts indicate
the neighborhood.
We focus now on the residential choices. Although the voting equilibrium
depends on the residential allocation, it is not inﬂuenced by individual
(atomistic) household choice, implying that households treat the antici-
pated voting outcome as a given in the residential-choice stage. Our pri-
mary concern is with the nature of equilibria having diﬀerentiated neigh-
borhoods, school peer groups, and school qualities. An issue relevant to the
equilibrium allocation of households about which there is little evidence is
how student ability aﬀects the demand for school quality. We restrict con-






  is invariant to ability;
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of ability (i.e.,   Eh[b] in the school). If h(b) is concave, for example, then decreases in Roth-
schilde-Stiglitz variability of student ability increase peer quality, accommodating the cur-
riculum-specialization hypothesis. See Epple, Newlon, and Romano (2002) and Epple and Ro-
mano (1999) for more detail about this generalization of the model. For expositional ease, we





  increases with ability.
In the latter case, the demand for school quality is normal in student abil-
ity. The case in equation (3) is neutral on this issue and is a property of the
Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation.
The ﬁrst proposition describes some necessary properties of any equilib-
rium with diﬀerentiated schools or neighborhoods.
P 1. For K   N, suppose q1   q2   ...     qK. (If K   N, then
some neighborhoods have schools of the same quality.) Then the following will
occur: (a) Housing prices ascend: p1   p2   ...     pK. (b) The allocation ex-
hibits income stratiﬁcation: If household with income y1 chooses neighbor-
hood having school quality qi and household with child of the same ability but
income y2 necessarily chooses neighborhood having higher school quality qj(j
  i), then y2   y1. (c) If assumption (4) holds, the allocation exhibits ability
stratiﬁcation analogously deﬁned.16 Under equation (3), household residen-
tial choice is invariant to the student’s ability. (d) The allocation exhibits
boundary indiﬀerence and strict preference within boundaries: Type space
(the [b, y] plane) is partitioned into neighborhoods by (measure zero) bound-
aries along which the corresponding households are indiﬀerent to adjacent
neighborhoods, and for which interior households have strict preference for
their neighborhood over diﬀerentiated neighborhoods.
P. Since everyone pays the same tax rate, part (a) follows simply.
Housing price must be lower if school quality is lower to attract any res-
idents. Given part (a), the converse of part (b) contradicts equation (1).
Part (c) is proved analogously. Part (d) is implied by continuity of U( ).
Figure 7.3 illustrates a potential equilibrium allocation for a case with K
  N   3 and assuming equation (3). Stratiﬁcation by income arises but not
by ability, households with incomes y1 (y2) are indiﬀerent to residing in
neighborhoods 1 or 2 (2 or 3), and all other households strictly prefer their
neighborhood of residence. For preferences instead satisfying equation (4),
the boundary loci in type space separating diﬀerentiated neighborhoods
are downward sloping, exhibiting stratiﬁcation by both ability and income.
The next proposition establishes conditions for existence of equilibrium
with diﬀerentiated neighborhoods and schools (continuing to take as given
existence and uniqueness of voting equilibrium).
P 2. (a) Equilibrium with diﬀerentiated schools exists if prefer-
ences satisfy equation (3) and E[b|y] is increasing in y. (b) Equilibrium with
diﬀerentiated schools sometimes exists if preferences satisfy equation (4) and
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16. For any given income, only higher-ability students attend higher-quality schools.either E[b|y] is increasing in y or constant. (c) Constancy of E[b|y] and pref-
erences satisfying equation (3) are inconsistent with existence of equilibrium
having diﬀerentiated schools.
P. We show part (a) in the appendix by construction (see the proof
of proposition A1). We have worked out examples demonstrating part (b),
which are available on request. Regarding part (c), under equation (3),
proposition 1 shows that an equilibrium with diﬀerentiated schools must
exhibit stratification by income but not by ability (e.g., as in figure 7.3).
However, constancy of E[b|y] then implies equal  s in all schools, hence
schools of equivalent quality—a contradiction.
School qualities can vary due only to variation in peer groups because ex-
penditures are equalized across neighborhoods. Access to neighborhoods
with better peer groups is rationed by higher housing prices. This rationing
must be consistent with diﬀerentiated peer groups for such an equilibrium.
If willingness to pay for school quality depends only on income (i.e., under
equation [3]), then stratiﬁcation across neighborhoods will be determined
solely by income, as in ﬁgure 7.3. Income and ability must then be positively
correlated to produce the school quality hierarchy. The mean ability or
peer-group measure in any neighborhood i (i   1, 2, . . . , N) can be written
thus:
(5)  i     ,
 yi
yi 1E[by]     bx
bm f(b, y)db dy
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Fig. 7.3 Residences and peer groups in neighborhood equilibriumwhere yi–1 is the minimum income type of household residing in neighbor-
hood i and yi is the maximum. Hence, given that E[b|y] is increasing in y,
the income stratiﬁcation implies school quality stratiﬁcation.
Alternatively, if willingness to pay for school quality also increases with
the child’s ability (i.e., under equation [4]), then positive correlation be-
tween ability and income is unnecessary for a diﬀerentiated equilibrium. In
these equilibria, the (b, y) plane is partitioned into neighborhoods by down-
ward-sloping boundary loci, with relatively high-income and low-ability
households mixing with relatively low-income and high-ability households.
Although the existence of equilibrium with diﬀerentiated neighborhoods
cannot generally be shown under equation (4), we have consistently found
such equilibria in simulations of speciﬁc cases.
In all that follows (and without constant repetition), we adopt the as-
sumption in equation (3) and thus also assume that E[b|y] is increasing in
y. With N neighborhoods, equilibrium can have N diﬀerent neighborhood
peer groups and school qualities. In fact, proposition A1 in the appendix
shows that a multiplicity of such equilibria exists if neighborhoods diﬀer in
size. We henceforth assume that school administrators choose neighbor-
hood boundaries so that schools are of the same size, thus eliminating this
multiplicity. This is a natural simplifying assumption because diﬀerentiated
equilibria arise whether or not schools are of equal size, and no new issues
arise in extending the results to schools of unequal size. We also anchor the
housing price in the poorest neighborhood at c, as must arise in the varia-
tion of the model with elastic housing supply in one neighborhood, elimi-
nating a degree of freedom in housing prices that arises otherwise. Other
equilibria exist as well, with subsets of neighborhoods having the same peer
groups, school qualities, and housing prices, including the allocation with
no neighborhood diﬀerentiation. Such equilibria are unstable under rea-
sonable adjustment assumptions.17 This instability and the empirical evi-
dence (see below), including evidence on school-driven housing price dif-
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17. The argument that an equilibrium that is not maximally stratiﬁed will tend to be unstable
is as follows. An arbitrary ﬁnite perturbation of the residences across neighborhoods begin-
ning with  1    2 would generally imply diﬀerences in the peer measures. Households would
relocate toward the higher-quality neighborhood and bid up its relative housing price, imply-
ing that the relocation pattern would satisfy income stratiﬁcation (as in proposition 1[b]). In
turn, the relocations and the assumption in equation (1) would imply greater quality diﬀeren-
tial, and so on. To formalize this argument, one needs to make assumptions about the rates at
which types relocate and what they anticipate would change, if anything. Consider an example.
Suppose that there are two neighborhoods, initially homogeneous with p1   p2   c. Perturb
their residences so that  2is a little higher than  1. Now let an arbitrarily selected positive mea-
sure of types relocate and suppose that they anticipate no changes in variables due to their own
relocations. The housing market price that clears their housing exchanges must have p2   p1
(the latter price might be anchored at c), and the relocation pattern must satisfy income strat-
iﬁcation among those moving. However, then  2 would rise further and  1 would decline fur-
ther, these implied by equation (1) and the assumption that the measure permitted to move was
selected arbitrarily (i.e., the  s would change as stated with probability one).ferentials within jurisdictions (Black 1999; Barrow 1999), lead us to ignore
such equilibria.
Hence, we study the equilibrium with each neighborhood having a diﬀ-
erentiated school and with a housing price of c in the poorest neighbor-
hood. We emphasize that all stable equilibria in our model, whether or not
schools are of equal size, have every neighborhood school diﬀerentiated.
Central cities in the United States are typically served by a single school
district, as is assumed in our model, and provide evidence supporting our
predictions. Income stratiﬁcation across central-city neighborhood schools
of the form we have described is quite evident in cities. Data from high
schools in the city school district of Los Angeles (i.e., the Los Angeles Uni-
ﬁed District) provide an illustration of the extent of income stratiﬁcation.
Although direct measures of household income by school are unavailable,
data are available on the percentage of students in each school who are from
low-income households—children who qualify for free or reduced-price
lunch.
In panel A of ﬁgure 7.4 we plot the percentage of low-income students in
each of the ﬁfty-ﬁve “regular” high schools in the city of Los Angeles for the
1997–98 school year. We exclude schools classiﬁed in the Common Core of
Data as “special educational” or “alternative,” mainly because they fre-
quently have much smaller enrollments, although their inclusion would not
alter the message. In this plot, schools are ordered by their percentage of
low-income students. This ﬁgure reveals that there is substantial income
stratiﬁcation. As a benchmark for comparison, consider random assign-
ment of students to schools. We also show in panel A of ﬁgure 7.4 the 95
percent conﬁdence bounds for the mean number of low-income students
per school under random assignment of this population of students to
schools.18 The narrowness of these bounds stands in dramatic contrast to
the observed variation across schools, conﬁrming that there is a high degree
of income stratiﬁcation across neighborhood schools. In addition to peer
eﬀects in schools, there is no doubt that other factors support the observed
stratiﬁcation. These include incentives to interact regularly with others of
similar background (educational, socioeconomic, and racial), incentives to
locate near employment, and a durable and somewhat stratiﬁed existing
housing stock. Our analysis of neighborhood equilibria attributes all strat-
iﬁcation to school-based peer eﬀects, which is clearly an exaggeration.
Research on local jurisdictions, following Tiebout, has traditionally em-
phasized sorting across rather than within jurisdictions. Most of the high
schools in the other 110 districts in metropolitan Los Angeles have just one
or a few high schools. In 1997–98, 41 percent of these districts had one (reg-
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18. We use the normal approximation to the binomial distribution in calculating these con-
ﬁdence bounds, which is quite accurate given that the smallest school has 212 students and all
but three schools have over 1,000 students. The ﬂuctuation in the boundaries reﬂects diﬀer-
ences in the sizes of the schools.ular) high school, 62 percent had two or less, and 78 percent had three or
less. Thus, jurisdictions in suburban Los Angeles accord reasonably well
with the kind of structure presumed in most prior research. In light of this,
it is of interest to compare stratiﬁcation patterns between the 53 city high
schools and the 266 suburban high schools in the Los Angeles metropolitan
area. This is done in panel B of ﬁgure 7.4. The solid curve in the plot repro-
duces panel A of figure 7.4, and the new curve contains the percentage of
low-income students for the suburban schools, with these also ordered by
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A
B
Fig. 7.4 A, Percent low-income students and 95 percent conﬁdence bounds for high
schools in Los Angeles uniﬁed district; B, percent low-income students in high schools
in the Los Angeles metropolitan areatheir percentages of low-income students. There is, as expected, stratiﬁca-
tion by income between city and suburbs. The mean of the proportion of
low-income students in the city schools is 0.525, whereas it is 0.312 in the
suburban schools. Of more interest, however, is the degree of stratiﬁcation
among suburban (Tiebout) schools relative to the degree of stratiﬁcation
among city (neighborhood) schools. Inspection of panel B suggests that the
pattern of stratiﬁcation among the city schools is not dramatically diﬀerent
from that of the suburban schools. The standard deviations of percentage
of low-income students in the city and the suburbs are 0.222 and 0.230, re-
spectively. Although it is not clear what is the right metric for comparing
stratiﬁcation in the two cases, the data for Los Angeles high schools reveal
a high degree of income stratiﬁcation across all schools and point to the
need for more extensive investigation of the sorting of households within ju-
risdictions.
We now discuss voting equilibrium. To obtain precise results, we restrict
consideration henceforth to the Cobb-Douglas utility speciﬁcation (1).19
We also set N   2 in what follows for simplicity. Hence, the neighborhood
housing capacities are 1/2, and we know that the equilibrium partition of
households has y1   ymed as the boundary locus, ymed denoting the median
income. Number the poorer neighborhood 1 and the wealthier neighbor-
hood 2. Using equation (2) and setting p1   c, ﬁnd p2 from the fact that the
median-income household is indiﬀerent to residence in equilibrium (propo-
sition 1[d]):







Since the partition implies  1   2(and assuming the median-income house-
hold can aﬀord a house), inspection of equation (6) conﬁrms that p2   p1.
We also see that housing prices are independent of per-student expenditure,
due to the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation.
One can ﬁnd voting equilibrium following the methodology used in Ep-
ple and Romer (1991). The detailed analysis is in the appendix. Here we
summarize the logic and results. Assume for simplicity that only tax rates
that allow the poorest type to purchase homes can be adopted: t   (ym – c)/
ym.20 It turns out that preference for higher-expenditure tax pairs increases
with y/p. That is, households with a higher ratio of income to housing price
favor more educational expenditure, although this requires a higher tax
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19. Voting equilibrium can be shown to exist much more generally. See Roberts (1977),
Epple and Romer (1991), and Gans and Smart (1996).
20. We have in mind an income policy that precludes equilibrium taxation such that the
poorest household cannot aﬀord housing in so restricting feasible taxes. A speciﬁc policy that
yields this without direct restriction on the tax rate dictates no additional tax liability once a
household is driven down to subsistence: Household with income y pays a maximum of y – c
in taxes. One can conﬁrm that proposition 3 continues to apply without its tax ceiling under
our assumption below that problem (8) has an interior solution.rate. The tax rate most preferred by households with median value of y/p is
then majority preferred. The latter tax and implied per-student educational
expenditure is the equilibrium pair because it would defeat any other feasi-
ble pair in a tax referendum.
With one minor technical assumption on the income distribution (see
equation [A1] in the appendix), there are median-preference households re-
siding in (the poorer) neighborhood 1 having income denoted yp1 and me-
dian-preference households residing in neighborhood 2 having income yp2
  (p2/c)yp1. Letting Fy denote the marginal cumulative density function
(c.d.f.) of income, yp1 solves
(7) F y(yp1)   F y  
p
c
2  yp1    0.5    0.5.
We have the following proposition:
P 3. The solution to
(8) maxt,X[yp1(1   t)   c]X 







is the unique majority voting equilibrium, where y  denotes the mean income in
the population.
The solution to problem (8) is
















  y  ,
provided it is not on the upper bound of t, which is easily ruled out.21 Com-
parison to other policy outcomes and numerical examples are provided be-
low.
To  summarize to this point, for Cobb-Douglas preferences, E[b|y] in-
creasing in y, and two neighborhoods of equal size, equilibrium splits
households by income at the median into the two neighborhoods, with the
wealthy neighborhood having higher   (equation [5]). With p1   c, the re-
maining equilibrium variables are described by equations (6), (7), and (9).
In addition to the pivotal voters in neighborhood 1, those with income
p2yp1/c, who reside in neighborhood 2, also have median voting preferences.
Equilibrium is characterized by income stratiﬁcation across neighbor-
hoods, with diﬀerences in school quality deriving from diﬀerences in peer
groups. More neighborhoods would increase stratiﬁcation and the spread
of schools’ peer qualities. Although stratiﬁcation aﬀects expenditure levels
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21. This requires  (1 – c/yp1)/(1    )   (ym – c)/ym. One set of suﬃcient conditions is   1
and ym   2c.(as will be discussed further), diﬀerences in school qualities obviously have
nothing to do with expenditures. All that is needed is that a positive exter-
nality in schooling is correlated with household income. The preponder-
ance of research concerning diﬀerences in quality of public schools empha-
sizes expenditure diﬀerences.  However, equalization of ﬁnance will not
itself create equal-quality schools. The emphasis on expenditure in most of
the literature as well as in policy reform misses a crucial element of the equi-
librium determination of schooling quality. The concern for the implica-
tions of peer-group eﬀects in schooling is further heightened by the evi-
dence indicating that expenditure per se matters little (e.g., see Hanushek
1986). We return to this discussion after clarifying the implications of al-
ternative policies and welfare eﬀects.
7.4.2 Equilibrium with School Choice
The analysis of school choice with no frictions is straightforward. House-
holds select schools without constraint in the second stage of ﬁgure 7.2. We
assume schools face no capacity constraints and must admit all comers.22
School ﬁnance continues to entail an allocation of funds to schools so as to
equalize expenditure per student. Those who send their child to school in
the “other neighborhood” bear no transportation or other transactions
costs (introduced later).23 Lacking evidence on productivity eﬀects of in-
tradistrict choice, we hold ﬁxed the schooling production function q( ).
The immediate implication is that the exercise of school choice must lead
to equal school qualities in equilibrium, and, since expenditures are equal-
ized,  1   2. Further, indiﬀerence to residence is implied, so that p2 p1( 
c). Voting equilibrium continues to reﬂect the preference of a household
with median ratio of income to housing price. Because housing prices do
not vary, only one type of household has median preference: those families
with median income (who can live in either neighborhood). The solution to
equation (9) substituting ymed for yp1 is the outcome of the voting equilib-
rium.24 We have established the following proposition:
P 4. Equilibrium values with frictionless choice are given by








   y  ,
where     denotes the mean ability in the entire population. Households with
median income are pivotal in the voting equilibrium. The residential allocation
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22. The same results obtain if there are capacity constraints, but every applicant, indepen-
dent of residence, has the same probability of admittance. Aggregate uncertainties disappear
because of the atomism of households.
23. We also ignore any possible changes in transportation costs borne by taxpayers. Explicit
consideration of transportation costs borne by taxpayers would not eﬀect the set of equilib-
rium residential and school choices, since these costs are invariant to individual choices.
24. The parameter restrictions provided in footnote 21 continue to be suﬃcient.is indeterminate. Any allocation assigning half the population to each neigh-
borhood is an equilibrium. Any set of school choices resulting in  1    2 is an
equilibrium set.
Comparing equilibria, introduction of (frictionless) school choice leads
to higher  1 and lower  2. Using equations (9) and (10) and that ymed   yp1,
the tax rate and expenditure are higher under choice. This is explained by
an income eﬀect on voting from a lower p2. The strongest implication is that
households with income below the median attend better schools unam-
biguously. Further normative and quantitative analysis is in section 7.5.
Interneighborhood Transportation Costs
We now introduce friction in the exercise of school choice. We assume
that it costs any household T to send its child to school in the other neigh-
borhood. Hence, for example, intraneighborhood transportation is costless
(or provided), but households bear a private cost of Tto transport their chil-
dren between neighborhoods as across a “Hoxby river” (Hoxby 2000a).
Transportation costs eﬀectively prohibit the exercise of choice if T ex-
ceeds the housing price diﬀerential that arises without choice. Here equi-
librium is as though choice is not allowed. Letting p∗
2 denote neighborhood
2’s housing price in the equilibrium without choice, we then suppose
(11) T   p∗
2   c,
which is clearly the more realistic case.
We describe an “interior equilibrium,” one in which some but not all
households exercise choice. Figure 7.5 depicts an interior equilibrium allo-
cation.25 A threshold income below the median, y1, divides households ac-
cording to the neighborhood where their children attend school. Those with
income below y1 live in neighborhood 1, and their children attend school
there. Those with higher income send their children to the better school in
neighborhood 2 but are indiﬀerent to their neighborhood of residence. A
number of households equal to one-half the population drawn from the lat-
ter group must live in neighborhood 2 for housing-market clearance. Their
residential indiﬀerence is supported by a housing price diﬀerential equal to
the transportation cost:
(12) p2   c   T.
Living in neighborhood 1 and paying the transportation cost is equivalent
to avoiding it but paying the higher housing price in neighborhood 2.
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25. Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2000) provide evidence of sorting due to public school choice
among high schools in Chicago that is consistent with the equilibrium we describe. When in-
strumenting for peer groups to correct for potential endogeneities they fail, however, to ﬁnd
evidence of peer eﬀects on graduation rates.Let  i∗(yI), i   1, 2, denote the implied mean ability in neighborhood i.
Since E[b|y] is increasing,  ∗
2  ∗
1for all yI, although housing-market clear-
ance requires yI   ymed. Indiﬀerence to transporting one’s child from neigh-
borhood 1 to 2 for schooling identiﬁes yI:
(13) T   [yI(1   t)   c][1   R(yI) ],
where R(yI)    ∗
1/ ∗
2.
Voting equilibrium can be determined analogously to the previous mod-
els with T   c replacing the housing price for those who live in neighbor-
hood 1 and transport their child to school in neighborhood 2. All those with
y   yI pay “eﬀective housing price” equal to p2. There is always a median
preference voter with y   yI, whose income we denote yp2 (and there may or
may not be one having y   yI). By ordering households according to their
income divided by eﬀective housing price, one can identify yp2as detailed in
the appendix. Replacing yp1 with yp2 in equation (9), we compute26










  ; and X   ty  .
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Fig. 7.5 Residences and peer groups with public-school choice and transport cost
26. The parameter restrictions in footnote 21 remain suﬃcient.P 5. Assume equation (11) is satisﬁed and any voting equilib-
rium permits everyone to aﬀord housing. A solution (p2, yI, t, yp2, X) with yI 
ymed to equations (12) through (14), with yp2 as calculated in the appendix,
and with  i    i∗(yI), i   1, 2, is an interior equilibrium with allocation de-
picted in ﬁgure 7.5 (and with any mass equal to one-half of households having
y   y I living in neighborhood 2).
Although existence and uniqueness of an interior equilibrium are not
guaranteed, we ﬁnd unique interior equilibrium for a range of Tin our com-
putational model of section 7.5. Another possibility is a “boundary equi-
librium” having p2   T   c, but where everyone attends school in neigh-
borhood 2. Here T is low enough that choice induces everyone to get the
same schooling.
Relative to the no-choice equilibrium, the exercise of choice by those with
below-median income is on average associated with a negative peer-group
externality to both those who stay behind and attend school in neighbor-
hood 1, and to those with above-median income. Both  1 and  2 decline be-
cause E[b|y] is an increasing function of y. The decline in neighborhood 1,
borne by the poorest segment of the population, supports the concerns of
some critics of choice: Those least equipped to exercise choice suﬀer from
its introduction. Because the outcome of the voting equilibrium changes,
we must quantify eﬀects to pursue further normative analysis, which is
taken up later in section 7.5.
7.4.3 Multiple Jurisdictions: Tiebout Equilibrium
It is of interest to compare the single-district equilibria above to the more
decentralized provision regime, in which education ﬁnance is highly local-
ized. Here the two neighborhoods are assumed to correspond to two polit-
ical jurisdictions for the determination of the tax rate and per-student ex-
penditure. Policy dictates that households’ children must attend school in
their neighborhood-district of residence. Otherwise, we maintain the prop-
erties of the model including Cobb-Douglas preferences (hence equation
[3]), the same housing capacities of 1/2 in each now-jurisdiction, and E[b|y]
increasing in y. As in the single-district model without choice, the school-
choice stage is trivial because, again, school is dictated by residence. This
version of our model is akin to an environment with small school districts
that is fairly densely populated as in areas of Pennsylvania, New Hamp-
shire, Ohio, and Vermont, for example.27
We focus again on equilibrium with diﬀerentiated schools for the same
reasons as above. First, we have the following proposition:
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27. The 1993–94 respective ratios of high schools to districts in these states were 1.20, 1.03,
1.27, and 1.02 (U.S. Department of Education 1994).P6.Any equilibrium with diﬀerentiated schools exhibits the fol-
lowing: (a) stratiﬁcation by income (independent of ability); and (b) bound-
ary indiﬀerence and strict preference within boundaries.
P. Using equation (2), calculate the sign of the utility diﬀerence ( )
from residing in neighborhood 2 versus 1: sgn   sgn {[(1 – t2)q2 – (1 –
t1)q1]y  (p1q1– p2q2)}. Housing market clearance implies that one-half the
population lives in each neighborhood. Linearity of   in y then implies ei-
ther income stratiﬁcation (that is independent of ability) and diﬀerentiated
schools or that   vanishes for every income. The latter case is an unstable
equilibrium having everyone indiﬀerent. Given that   does not vanish for
some y, boundary indiﬀerence for y   ymed and strict preference otherwise
are then implied by the linearity.
Residential choices and peer groups are then the same as in the single-
jurisdiction model without choice. Each neighborhood or jurisdiction
chooses its own tax rate, however. Households within a neighborhood face
the same housing price, and voting equilibrium is calculated as above. The
households with median preferences in neighborhoods 1 and 2 have ﬁrst-
quartile income (yq1) and third-quartile income (yq3), respectively. The voter’s
problems are analogous to equation (8) with the obvious substitutions:28










  ; X1   t1y  1;










  ; and X2   t2y  2,
where y  i, i   1, 2, denotes mean income in neighborhood i. Note that it is
not immediately clear where tax rates are higher and where per student ex-
penditure is higher. Boundary indiﬀerence implies that prices satisfy
(17) [ymed(1   t2)   p2]q2   [ymed(1   t1)   p1]q1,
which allows us to demonstrate the following:
P 7. q2   q1 in equilibrium.
P. If p2   p1, then t2   t1 and X2   X1, both by equations (15) and
(16). The better peer group in neighborhood 2 then implies the result. For
the case of p1 p2, suppose to the contrary that q2 q1. From equation (17),
then, [ymed(1 – t2) – p2]   [ymed(1 – t1) – p1], implying p2 – p1   (t1 – t2)ymed.
Substitute from equations (15) and (16) for the ts in the latter, yielding
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28. Again we assume that t is not at its upper bound, and again the conditions in footnote
21 continue to be suﬃcient, assuming p1   c.Since  /(1    )   1 and yq3   ymed   yq1, equation (18) contradicts p2   p1.
Proposition A2 in the appendix provides conditions for existence of diﬀ-
erentiated equilibrium. These conditions also imply that the housing price
will be lower in the poorer district, hence p1   c. They are satisﬁed in realis-
tic cases, including our computational analysis in the next section.
Relative to the single-jurisdiction, multineighborhood environment with-
out choice, one would expect here lower per-student expenditure in the
poor neighborhood-district and the opposite in the wealthy neighborhood-
district due to the changes in the tax base. A wider dispersion in school
quality under multiple jurisdictions is then implied. The theoretical analysis
is, however, obscured by changes across the equilibria in the identities of the
pivotal voters and housing prices. We explore this issue computationally in
section 7.5.
For our Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation with ﬁxed housing capacities, resi-
dential choices and thus peer groups are exactly the same, with no school
choice whether or not neighborhoods are also political jurisdictions. This
illustrates a central result of this paper: Peer-group eﬀects alone can lead to
income-stratiﬁed equilibrium and school quality diﬀerences, as in a Tiebout
equilibrium with local public ﬁnance.29 If we depart from a Cobb-Douglas
speciﬁcation or assume upward-sloping housing supplies, then the residen-
tial allocation will vary somewhat across the two regimes. However, this is
only to the extent that educational expenditure is important to school qual-
ity. In the Cobb-Douglas case with upward-sloping housing supplies, for ex-
ample, the allocations converge as   → 0. If educational expenditure has
small eﬀects at the margin, as most evidence indicates (see Hanushek 1986,
1997 and Betts 1996), then policies that more evenly distribute educational
funds will not much reduce stratiﬁcation absent school choice.30
Interjurisdictional school choice is also worthy of study.31The analysis of
interjurisdictional school choice depends on how the choice policy imple-
ments school ﬁnance when choice is exercised. Here we brieﬂy summarize
some results, because space constraints prevent a complete presentation. In
an early version of this paper (Epple and Romano 1995), we analyzed fric-
tionless interjurisdictional choice assuming that those who cross district
boundaries bring with them their own jurisdiction’s locally determined per-
student expenditure. This policy leads to a nonstratiﬁed outcome and ho-
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29. As discussed in section 7.2, an alternative version of this result can be found in Benabou
(1993, 1996).
30. It is correct to observe that even for small  in the Cobb-Douglas case, stratiﬁcation may
result with multiple jurisdictions if E[by] is invariant to y, and equilibrium will not be strati-
ﬁed in the single-jurisdiction model. Note, however, that only slightly rising E[by] gets back
stratiﬁcation in the latter model. Moreover, for utility speciﬁcations satisfying equation (4) and
E[by] ﬂat, near equivalence holds as expenditure eﬀects disappear.
31. In 1993–94, 28.6 percent of school districts had interdistrict choice policies (U.S. De-
partment of Education 1996). However, only 1.6 percent of public school students residing in
these districts attended school outside of the district where they resided.mogeneous schools, but with a severe free-rider problem in school ﬁnance:
Voting to raise one’s local tax would attract outsiders (or reduce exit), and
this externality would lead to substantially lower schooling expenditure.
Anticipating this, an interjurisdictional choice policy might require that a
household exercising choice become a member of its chosen school’s juris-
diction for purposes of school ﬁnance. That is, it pays its chosen district’s
tax rate while being allowed to vote there on the school budget.32 We show
in the appendix that this policy would frequently lead to the same outcome
as does choice in a single jurisdiction if there are no frictions (i.e., nontax
costs) to exercising choice. The logic is that housing prices must be equal-
ized in equilibrium, and potential diﬀerences in tax rates will frequently not
alone be enough to support an outcome with stratiﬁed schools. However, as
we discuss more fully below, potential recipient districts generally have an
incentive to resist accepting students from outside the district, casting
doubt on the extent to which choice is likely to be frictionless.
7.5 Computational Analysis and Welfare Eﬀects
We begin with a general discussion of welfare issues that will facilitate the
interpretation of the computational results that follow. Although much of
our analysis concerns traditional eﬃciency measures, this is presented with
serious caveats. First, education is regarded by many as a primary means to
lessen equity problems, and we are not unsympathetic to this view. Second,
equity aside, long-term social externalities associated with low educational
achievement or wide variance in educational achievement may exist (e.g.,
crime and resentment). For both these reasons, it is important to also con-
sider the distribution of educational achievement.
A third caveat concerns education as an investment rather than a con-
sumption good. If education is an investment good, then our model implic-
itly assumes imperfect opportunities for borrowing on future earnings,
which constrains all households. This follows from our assumption that
household demand for educational quality increases with income.33 Such
credit constraints are also consistent with Peterson et al.’s ﬁndings (chap. 4
in this volume) that small partial vouchers are needed to induce poor fami-
lies to switch to private schools in spite of relatively large educational gains.
The standard static analysis does not properly measure welfare changes un-
der the investment interpretation; one must measure and value changes in
aggregate achievement and factor this into the welfare measure. Our belief
is that education has both investment and consumption value.
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32. Whether outsiders are allowed to vote or not does not matter to equilibrium.
33. Actually, our equilibrium results do not require a binding borrowing constraint on high-
income households, speciﬁcally those with income above the maximum income of any pivotal
voter. If demand ceases to increase with income above this threshold, all our equilibrium re-
sults continue to hold.With these reservations in mind, we turn to standard eﬃciency analysis.
Understanding properties of Pareto eﬃcient (PE) allocations provides per-
spective for understanding the variation in welfare (producer surplus plus
compensating variation) across the policy regimes analyzed below. In ex-
amining PE allocations, we assume that there are at most two schools and
that an allocation entails an assignment of all students to a school (i.e., no
schooling is not an option). Let Ai(b, y)   [0,1] denote the proportion of
students of type (b, y) attending school i, i   1, 2, so that A1(b, y)   A2(b, y)
  1 for all (b, y). For the applications we study, Ai will equal 0 or 1 for all
types: That is, eﬃcient student bodies entail no overlap of types. We assume
no transportation costs so that neighborhood residence is irrelevant to eﬃ-
ciency. Set pi   c, i   1, 2, giving the anonymous land owners no rents.
Proposition 8 is the main result in Epple and Romano (2000). It includes a
description of the “social marginal cost” of a student attending school i,
which we denote SMCi. Also, let ri(b, y) denote the “regulated price” that a
social planner charges type (b, y) to attend school i. Actually, ri(b, y) will
turn out to be a function only of b at the optimum as we will see.
Proposition 8 is a variant of the Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem
in economics.
P 8. If appropriate lump-sum transfers of income are arranged,
then every PE allocation can be achieved by utility-maximizing school choices,
with, for all (b, y), students paying prices
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i   f(b, y)dbdy   
s Ai(b, y)f(b, y)dbdy, i  1, 2;
(21) Ui(b, y)   U[y   c   R(b, y)   ri(b, y), a(q(Xi, Ei), b], i   1, 2;
R(b, y) denoting the lump-sum transfer function; and, ﬁnally, i,i 1,2,and
Ai(b, y) as implied by utility-maximizing choices.
P. See Epple and Romano (2000).
Here we provide only intuition for this result, with formal proof in the pa-
per cited. With prices that reﬂect the peer externality in schools (and eﬃ-
ciently chosen expenditure levels), individual school choice will yield an
eﬃcient allocation. The social cost of type (b, y) entering school i is given
by SMCi, which equals the per-student expenditure plus the dollar value of
the peer-group externality. The value of the peer externality is the last term
in equation (19). q /qX equals the cost of maintaining quality as   changes,
which is multiplied by ( i – b), the change in  i that results due to student
type b’s attendance at i. Note that the peer-group cost of attendance is neg-
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 i), and their SMC can then be negative. Note, too, that the social cost de-
pends on b, but not y. Hence, eﬃcient prices depend on ability but not in-
come.
The eﬃcient expenditure levels satisfy the within-school “Samuelsonian
conditions” in equation (20) that equate the sum of marginal values of edu-
cational expenditure to marginal expenditure cost. Note that school bud-
gets balance: Integrating ri over the student body in i yields total expendi-
ture in school i. The lump-sum transfers that are considered must also
satisfy budget balance.
We next consider implications in the case of Cobb-Douglas utility that we
have adopted. A natural benchmark allocation presumes no income trans-
fers, so set R(b, y)   0 for all (b, y). We have the following proposition:
P 9. For Cobb-Douglas utility/achievement, the no-transfer PE
allocation has (a) q2   q1; (b) stratiﬁcation by income with linear boundary
locus









1q1   b,
where  i   (q /qX)i,i  1, 2; (c)
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where y  i and  i are the school means implied by the eﬃcient allocation. Fur-
ther,E[b|y] invariant to y is suﬃcient for (d) 2    1; and (e) stratification
by ability (hence, a downward-sloping boundary locus). If, also,   1, then
(f) X2   X1.
P. See the appendix.
Figure 7.6 illustrates a typical PE allocation, calculated for the baseline
case of our computational model (parameter values match those in table
7.1, discussed later). It is notable that a strict hierarchy (q2   q1) is eﬃcient
even if expenditure is not permitted to vary (see Epple and Romano 1998).
This is because relatively low-ability and high-income types are willing to
subsidize relatively low-income and high-ability types to attend the same
school. This necessarily leads to a downward-sloping boundary between
the student bodies if b and y are independently distributed (results [d] and
[e] in proposition 9). However, the eﬃcient boundary locus will typically be
downward sloping when E[b|y] is increasing in y as well, as we have found
consistently in numerous computations (e.g., ﬁgure 7.6 has E[b|y] increas-
ing in y). Similarly, the condition in part (f) of proposition 9 that   1 for
(X2    2 2)q2   (X1    1 1)q1     
q2   q1
Schools, Choice, and the Distribution of Educational Beneﬁts 255X2 X1is unnecessary, but neither is it very restrictive. As discussed further
in section 7.6, a private schooling equilibrium also results in a (nearly) PE
allocation.
This PE benchmark reveals sources of ineﬃciency in the equilibrium out-
comes above. Welfare gains would result on average from partitioning the
population into schools as in ﬁgure 7.6. We then expect that the introduc-
tion of public-school choice will tend to reduce aggregate welfare, because
the neighborhood-school partition is a better approximation to the eﬃcient
partition when E[b|y] is increasing. The neighborhood-equilibrium parti-
tion is not, however, eﬃcient in general. The implicit pricing of schools in
neighborhood equilibrium through housing prices is independent of ability,
hence, incorrectly accounts for the peer-group eﬀect. As the correlation in
(b, y) increases, partitioning only according to income as in the neighbor-
hood equilibrium becomes a perfect substitute for partitioning by income
and ability. While the point of partition in the neighborhood equilibrium
will not generally be the eﬃcient one since it is driven by neighborhood lines
and their housing supplies, this line of argument suggests that welfare losses
from choice will rise with the correlation in (b, y).
Proposition 9-f indicates that expenditure “typically” rises with school
quality in the eﬃcient allocation. Consider centralized versus decentralized
ﬁnance (Tiebout equilibrium) without school choice. Comparing equations
(15) and (16) to equation (23), we see decentralized ﬁnance provides a ﬁrst
approximation to the eﬃcient outcome. A standard voting bias from me-
dian (neighborhood) income diﬀering from mean income arises, as does an-
other voting bias from the distorted housing price in neighborhood 2. Nev-
ertheless, we expect that centralization of ﬁnance (absent choice) will lower
welfare.
Tables 7.1 through 7.7 present representative results from our equilib-
rium computations, with table 7.1 the “baseline case.” Throughout, we set
the minimum population ability bm   0 and assume
256 Dennis Epple and Richard Romano
Fig. 7.6 Boundary locus for eﬃcient allocation (parameter values are as in table 7.1)  
is distributed bivariate normal with covariance matrix
   .
We set ym   $5,000 and use 1989 U.S. annual mean ($36,360) and median
($28,860) income to set the mean and variance of ln(y – ym). We use the
Cobb-Douglas utility achievement function, which (not obviously) implies
that the mean of ability is irrelevant to our calculations.
We calibrate the distribution of ability so that it has the same median and
mean as income. This may be motivated as follows. Consider a steady state
and suppose that income is proportional to achievement. This provides a
cardinalization of achievement, and this, coupled with the educational pro-
duction function, induces a distribution on ability. For simplicity we cali-
brate ability for a case in which all students receive the same educational
quality. In this case, the Cobb-Douglas achievement function implies that
the logarithm of achievement is a linear function of the logarithm of ability.
Hence, in this case, the steady-state lognormal distribution of income and
the assumption that income is proportional to achievement imply that abil-
ity has a lognormal distribution as well. It is then convenient to choose the
unit of measurement of ability so that the mean and median of ability for
this case of equal school qualities equals the mean and median of income.
Two papers (Solon 1992; Zimmerman 1992) provide evidence on the cor-
relation between fathers’ and sons’ income, and they are in agreement that
the best point estimate of this correlation is approximately 0.4. Hence, we
set   0.4 in the baseline case. This completes the calibration of f(b, y).
We have set   0.06 because this implies that a household’s educational
expenditure would be approximately 5.6 percent   /(1    ) percent of its
income, the actual U.S. educational percentage expenditure in 1989. Lack-
ing evidence on the relative importance of peer group and expenditure, we
also set   0.06 in the baseline case. The value of   is irrelevant to our cal-
culations, again due to the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation.
We set the annual amortized construction cost of a house, c, equal to
$2,500. Last, we set the transportation cost of exercising interneighborhood
choice equal to $300 for the baseline case of choice with friction. We have
computed equilibria with all parameters varied and report representative
results here.
In addition to the equilibrium values in the four policy regimes, each
table presents welfare changes relative to the neighborhood-school, one-
district equilibrium. CV i, i 1, 2, denotes the mean compensating variation
resulting from the policy change of those who reside in neighborhood i in
the neighborhood-school, one-district equilibrium. Adding to (1/2)(CV 1  
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Table 7.1 Equilibrium Properties of Four Policy Regimes
Neighborhood Choice, Neighborhood Choice,
Schools, One District Schools, One District
One District (T = 0) Two Districts (T = 300)
 1 28,565 36,360 28,565 18,450
 2 44,154 36,360 44,155 36,777
t1 0.051 0.052 0.049 0.051
t2 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.051
X1 1,858 1,880 958 1,865
X2 1,858 1,880 2,706 1,865
p2 3,142 2,500 4,569 2,800
q1 2.91 2.95 2.79 2.83
q2 2.98 2.95 3.05 2.95
yI 10,434
CV 1 228 –612 –59
CV 2 87.2 –352.0 –181.0
 p2 –642 1,428 –342
 W –163 232 –291
Notes: Peer measure of school i =  i; tax rate in neighborhood i = ti; per-student expenditure
of school i = Xi; housing price in neighborhood 2 = p2; quality of school i = qi; minimum in-
come attending school 2 in fourth equilibrium = yI; mean compensating variation relative to
ﬁrst equilibrium in neighborhood i = CV i; per capita welfare change relative to ﬁrst equilib-
rium =  W; cost of exercising choice when feasible = T. Parameters of utility/cost function:
  = 0.06;   = 0.06; c = 2,500. Parameters of distribution function:   = 0.40; y   = 36,360;
ymed = 28,860; b  = 36,360; bmed = 28,860.
CV 2) the per capita change in the housing price in neighborhood 2 (p1   c
always),  p2/2, one obtains the per capita welfare change (denoted  W)
equal to per capita producer surplus plus compensating variation. We have
calculated equilibrium values without redistributing the land rents for sim-
plicity and because it is not likely to have much eﬀect on equilibrium. In so
doing, we also avoid having to specify land ownership.34
Frictionless public-school choice lowers aggregate welfare in every simu-
lation (including all unreported ones): That is,  W is consistently negative.
Noting that per-student expenditure changes little from the benchmark
(one-district, neighborhood) equilibrium, and in fact rises (because of the
positive income eﬀect on voting from the reduction in p2), it is clear the wel-
fare loss is explained by the homogenization of peer groups. Comparing
table 7.1to 7.2,the latter having a higher (lower)  ( ), one sees that the wel-
fare loss rises with increased weight placed on the peer group in educational
achievement. (See also table 7.3.) The reason that CV 2 is usually positive
34. In our computations, if all land is owned by those with income above the 3rd quartile,
our equilibrium calculations would be unchanged. Skewing the top end of the net income dis-
tribution has no eﬀect on equilibrium because no such households are ever pivotal decision-
makers in our computations.Table 7.2 Equilibrium Properties of Four Policy Regimes
Neighborhood Choice, Neighborhood Choice,
Schools, One District Schools, One District
One District (T = 0) Two Districts (T = 300)
 1 28,565 36,360 28,565 14,392
 2 44,155 36,360 44,155 36,390
t1 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.043
t2 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043
X1 1,561 1,581 806 1,564
X2 1,561 1,581 2,283 1,564
p2 3,254 2,500 4,456 2,800
q1 2.96 3.01 2.87 2.82
q2 3.05 3.01 3.11 3.01
yI 7,598
CV 1 268.0 –512.0 –29.8
CV 2 101.8 –296.0 –196.6
 p2 –754 1,202 –554
 W –192 196 –340
Notes: For deﬁnitions of variables, see notes to table 7.1. Parameters of utility/cost function:
  = 0.05;   = 0.07; c = 2,500. Parameters of distribution function:   = 0.40; y   = 36,360;
ymed = 28,860; b  = 36,360; bmed = 28,860. Change from table 7.1:   lower;   higher.
Table 7.3 Equilibrium Properties of Four Policy Regimes
Neighborhood Choice, Neighborhood Choice,
Schools, One District Schools, One District
One District (T = 0) Two Districts (T = 300)
 1 28,565 36,360 28,565 22,074
 2 44,155 36,360 44,155 38,078
t1 0.059 0.060 0.057 0.060
t2 0.059 0.060 0.059 0.060
X1 2,152 2,173 1,107 2,184
X2 2,152 2,173 3,119 2,184
p2 3,031 2,500 4,681 2,800
q1 2.86 2.89 2.73 2.82
q2 2.92 2.89 3.00 2.90
yI 14,528
CV 1 188.4 –708.0 –62.8
CV 2 72.6 –406.0 –117.2
 p2 –530 1,650 –230
 W –135 268 –205
Notes: For deﬁnitions of variables, see notes to table 7.1. Parameters of utility/cost function:
  = 0.07;   = 0.05; c = 2,500. Parameters of distribution function:   = 0.40; y   = 36,360;
ymed = 28,860; b  = 36,360; bmed = 28,860. Change from table 7.1:   higher;   lower.when choice is introduced is because the housing price p2 declines—but
someone bears this loss.
Although choice causes an overall welfare loss, those residing initially in
neighborhood 1 consistently gain on average from its introduction. This
holds when we assign to this group a proportion of the loss in producer sur-
plus in the housing market from choice equal to its income share (these cal-
culations not shown in the tables).
Absent public-school choice, decentralizing the ﬁnance decision by go-
ing from one jurisdiction (or district) to two consistently increases welfare,
but it also increases the dispersion of school qualities. Since peer groups in
schools are unchanged, these result because of changes in educational ex-
penditures. Not surprisingly, the housing price in neighborhood 2 rises sub-
stantially. Those initially residing in neighborhood 1 lose out on average
from decentralization of ﬁnance, and this persists if they are assigned their
income-proportional share of the increased producer surplus in the hous-
ing market (not shown). Hence, again, the poor are aﬀected in the direction
opposite to the average.
For the case of choice with a transport cost, we set T   300 in the com-
putations, letting it vary once (T   500 in table 7.4). With one exception
(table 7.5), we ﬁnd T 300 (or 500) induces a large percentage of those with
income below the median to exercise choice and attend school in neighbor-
hood 2, that percentage ranging from about 72.0 to 99.7. Compare this
equilibrium to frictionless choice with one district (ignoring table 7.5 for the
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Table 7.4 Equilibrium Properties of Four Policy Regimes
Neighborhood Choice, Neighborhood Choice,
Schools, One District Schools, One District
One District (T = 0) Two Districts (T = 500)
 1 28,844 36,360 28,844 14,857
 2 47,876 36,360 47,876 37,630
t1 0.051 0.052 0.049 0.051
t2 0.051 0.052 0.050 0.051
X1 1,849 1,880 958 1,862
X2 1,849 1,880 2,686 1,862
p2 3,461 2,500 4,870 3,000
q1 2.88 2.95 2.77 2.80
q2 3.00 2.95 3.07 2.96
yI 12,352
CV 1 358.0 –612.0 –99.8
CV 2 178.2 –340 –224
 p2 –960 1,410 –460
 W –212 229 –392
Notes: For deﬁnitions of variables, see notes to table 7.1. Parameters of utility/cost function:
  = 0.06;   = 0.06; c = 2,500. Parameters of distribution function:   = 0.60; y   = 36,360;
ymed = 28,860; b  = 36,360; bmed = 28,860. Change from table 7.1:   higher; T higher.moment). The voting equilibria are not much diﬀerent, so expenditures
vary little. The welfare loss from choice with transport costs exceeds that
from frictionless choice by about the amount of the transportation costs ex-
pended. Assigning the losses in producer surplus again by income shares
(not shown in the tables), we ﬁnd that the greater welfare loss under choice
with transport costs is borne largely by those with below-median income.
Those that exercise choice obviously pay the transportation costs. Those
that choose not to commute face a substantially diminished peer group.
The exceptional case of table 7.5 has low correlation of income and abil-
ity. The per capita welfare loss relative to the benchmark equilibrium equals
only $17.65. Because the peer group diﬀerence is small in the neighborhood
equilibrium, little incentive to exercise choice is present, and less than 9 per-
cent of those with below median income do so. Note, too, that the price
diﬀerence between neighborhoods (p2 – c) is only $322 in the benchmark
equilibrium for the parameter settings in table 7.5. This is another manifes-
tation of the limited value of the peer quality gain to migration in this case.
By contrast, for the other cases we report in the tables, the housing price
diﬀerential in the benchmark case is much larger, ranging between $530 and
$960. Table 7.6 has a higher construction cost of housing than in the base-
line case. This has a negative income eﬀect, manifest in lower schooling ex-
penditures in all equilibria and less exercise of choice when there is a trans-
portation cost.
Table 7.7 has a more right-skewed income distribution, holding constant
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Table 7.5 Equilibrium Properties of Four Policy Regimes
Neighborhood Choice, Neighborhood Choice,
Schools, One District Schools, One District
One District (T = 0) Two Districts (T = 300)
 1 32,427 36,360 32,427 32,102
 2 40,293 36,360 40,293 39,923
t1 0.051 0.052 0.049 0.051
t2 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.051
X1 1,869 1,880 958 1,863
X2 1,869 1,880 2,727 1,863
p2 2,822 2,500 4,268 2,800
q1 2.93 2.95 2.82 2.93
q2 2.97 2.95 3.04 2.97
yI 26,966
CV 1 108.60 –612.0 –8.44
CV 2 27.60 –362.00 –4.84
 p2 –322 1,446 –22
 W –92.9 236.0 –17.7
Notes: For deﬁnitions of variables, see notes to table 7.1. Parameters of utility/cost function:
  = 0.06;   = 0.06; c = 2,500. Parameters of distribution function:   = 0.20; y   = 36,360;
ymed =28,860; b  = 36,360; bmed = 28,860. Change from table 7.1:   lower.Table 7.6 Equilibrium Properties of Four Policy Regimes
Neighborhood Choice, Neighborhood Choice,
Schools, One District Schools, One District
One District (T = 0) Two Districts (T = 300)
 1 28,565 36,360 28,565 21,416
 2 44,155 36,360 44,155 37,748
t1 0.048 0.049 0.045 0.049
t2 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.049
X1 1,752 1,773 873 1,790
X2 1,752 1,773 2,612 1,790
p2 4,605 4,000 5,952 4,300
q1 2.90 2.94 2.78 2.85
q2 2.97 2.94 3.05 2.95
yI 13,644
CV 1 208.0 –556.0 –50.4
CV 2 47.0 –298.0 –126.6
 p2 –606 1,346 –306
 W –166 247 –241
Notes: For deﬁnitions of variables, see notes to table 7.1. Parameters of utility/cost function:
  = 0.06;   = 0.06; c = 4,000. Parameters of distribution function:   = 0.40; y   = 36,360;
ymed = 28,860; b  = 36,360; bmed = 28,860. Change from table 7.1: c higher.
Table 7.7 Equilibrium Properties of Four Policy Regimes
Neighborhood Choice, Neighborhood Choice,
Schools, One District Schools, One District
One District (T = 0) Two Districts (T = 300)
 1 28,565 36,360 28,565 22,860
 2 44,155 36,360 44,155 38,534
t1 0.051 0.052 0.048 0.053
t2 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.053
X1 2,300 2,326 839 2,365
X2 2,300 2,326 3,708 2,365
p2 3,142 2,500 5,139 2,800
q1 2.94 2.99 2.77 2.91
q2 3.02 2.99 3.11 3.00
yI 12,905
CV 1 200.0 –824.0 –31.4
CV 2 –126.4 –134.8 –192.0
 p2 –642 1,996 –342
 W –284 519 –283
Notes: For deﬁnitions of variables, see notes to table 7.1. Parameters of utility/cost function:
  = 0.06;   = 0.06; c = 2,500. Parameters of distribution function:   = 0.40; y   = 45,000;
ymed = 28,860; b  = 36,360; bmed = 28,860. Change from table 7.1: variance y higher.the median income. This is associated with greater inframarginal demand
for segregation by the relatively wealthy. This ampliﬁes the aggregate wel-
fare loss from frictionless choice and the aggregate welfare gain from neigh-
borhoods becoming jurisdictions.
An important warning concerning our normative analysis is that our
model abstracts from potential productivity gains from increased competi-
tion among schools for students. Hoxby (2000a) ﬁnds such gains when dis-
trict competition for students increases, as would occur with ﬁnance de-
centralization. Increased school choice within districts might have similar
eﬀects. Our model emphasizes the likely sorting eﬀects of such policies. Al-
though we do notby any means believe our welfare ﬁndings to be deﬁnitive,
we think it crucial in policy design to anticipate potential changes in school
composition.
7.6 Vouchers and Private Schooling
We have examined the consequences of introducing public-school choice
into a school district. One can interpret this choice policy as a voucher equal
to the average cost of schooling that can be used at any public school. Now
we examine the consequences of allowing vouchers to be used at a private
school. We focus on a voucher policy that will eliminate the public sector,
where the comparison will be between the allocations in panels B and C of
ﬁgure 7.1.
The choice program we examine provides a voucher of exogenous
amount to any student who chooses to attend a school other than his neigh-
borhood public school, the voucher ﬁnanced out of the income tax (ad-
justed to cover the cost of the voucher). Importantly, private schools ad-
mitting voucher students are unconstrained in all regards. Private schools
can pursue whatever admission and tuition policies they would like, in-
cluding selective admissions, tuition on top of the voucher, and giving of
scholarships and fellowships. Hence, we examine a laissez-faire voucher
system as described by Friedman (1962). Because of the free reign of the
market (and the magnitude of the voucher), the voucher equilibrium can
also be interpreted as an equilibrium with only private provision allowed,
but with a linear income tax that redistributes income so everyone can pay
the average cost of schooling. As we will discuss further, alternative voucher
policies that place restrictions on schools accepting voucher students may
have diﬀerent eﬀects.
We modify the model above in two ways. Because private schools have in-
centives to become very specialized in the student bodies they serve, we in-
troduce economies of scale into the provision of schooling, and this keeps
them from becoming inﬁnitely specialized. We do this by making an ele-
ment of school cost independent of quality-producing inputs, and these
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rising and convex. Expenditure on quality-producing inputs (X) is in addi-
tion to the latter costs and continues to exhibit constant returns to scale. For
any per-student expenditure on quality, the average cost is then U-shaped in
the number of students with the same eﬃcient scale.
The second modiﬁcation of the model is to simplify by exogenously ﬁx-
ing the expenditure per student on quality in every school, public or private,
at the same level. All variation in school quality is then due to variation in
the peer group. This simpliﬁcation does not aﬀect the qualitative nature of
sorting in equilibrium. We note the expected quantitative eﬀects of allow-
ing expenditure variation. The production function of educational quality
q continues to be as in equation (2), does utility, except now X is ﬁxed ex-
ogenously in all schools. Other than through eﬀects on the tax rate, none of
our following welfare calculations are aﬀected by the level of X because of
the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of utility and achievement. Later we con-
sider diﬀerences in productivity of public and private schools, but we as-
sume initially that they are equally productive.
Details of the modiﬁed calibration are in Epple and Romano (1998). We
calibrate the cost function of schooling so that the eﬃcient scale of opera-
tion is 3.03 percent of the population, with schooling cost of approximately
$4,200 per pupil. How these costs break down between custodial costs and
expenditure on quality-enhancing inputs is irrelevant to the calculations we
do (again due to the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation). The calibrated utility
function is the same as in the benchmark model above. We use the same cal-
ibration of the income distribution but with the simpliﬁcation that mini-
mum income equals 0. Hence, we also set c   0. Again we set the correla-
tion between income and ability equal to 0.4. We calibrate the ability
distribution using the same (steady-state) strategy as above, but here we
take account of the fact that the ratio of workers to school-age children is
2.6, implying a tighter ability distribution with mean 13,600 and median
11,300.
Private schools are modeled as in Epple and Romano (1998). They
choose tuition and admission policies to maximize proﬁts, and there is free
entry and exit. They can determine a student’s ability and his or her house-
hold income, implying that they can condition tuition and admission on
these characteristics as competition allows. They take as given every stu-
dent type’s willingness to pay for school quality. Assuming there is adequate
demand for quality of schooling for private schools to arise, equilibrium
satisﬁes some basic properties, which we brieﬂy summarize.35
Refer to panel A of ﬁgure 7.1, which depicts the case in this calibration
with public school choice and no voucher, where four private schools then
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35. Precise equilibrium fails to exist due to a variant of the integer problem, so we calculate
an approximate equilibrium. See Epple and Romano (1998) for details.enter and each earns (approximately) zero proﬁts. The private schools serve
nonoverlapping student sets as delineated by the four boundary loci in the
ﬁgure. Private schools each serve student bodies of size below the eﬃcient
scale (the density of types is low in the upper right of the [b, y] plane), in a
fashion similar to that of Chamberlin monopolistically competitive equi-
libria. Within each private school, relatively lower-ability and higher-
income types mix with relatively higher-ability and lower-income types.
Equilibrium pricing entails cross-subsidization within a private school
from the former to the latter students. Essentially, the higher-income types
are purchasing the positive peer eﬀect of the higher-ability types. In fact,
the peer externality is fully internalized: Prices to all students on the mar-
gin of switching schools equal social marginal cost as in equation (19), with
inframarginal students paying somewhat higher prices as schools take
away consumer surplus.36 A strict quality hierarchy of private schools al-
ways results. Because demand for schooling quality rises with income, the
lack of entry barriers (other than a free public schooling alternative!) leads
the private sector to reﬁne the quality of schooling limited only by
economies of scale. The internalization of the peer eﬀect implies an eﬃ-
cient allocation of the private-school students among the private schools
that enter. When public schools remain, they are of lower quality than any
private school.
The equilibrium with the voucher has a $4,200 voucher with allocation of
types into schools as depicted in panel B of ﬁgure 7.1. This voucher, equal
to average educational cost at the eﬃcient scale, wipes out public provision.
Because we have ﬁxed quality-enhancing expenditures and provided a
voucher that can cover these costs, the pricing ﬂexibility of private schools
permits them to engender student bodies that are more eﬃcient than a
public school would attract. This is not, however, to suggest a Pareto im-
provement from introducing a $4,200 voucher relative to the no-voucher
equilibrium of panel A. Private schools cream-skim high-ability students as
they enter with negative externalities for those of lower abilities who end up
in schools with weakened peer groups. Equilibrium properties are as in
panel A of ﬁgure 7.1, but, obviously, there is substantially more income and
ability stratiﬁcation and variability in school qualities. There are thirty-four
private schools, all serving less than (but close to) 3.03 percent of the pop-
ulation of students.
If expenditures are allowed to vary in public and private schools, the level
of the voucher necessary to eliminate public provision depends primarily on
the following factors. Although private schools have the increased advan-
tage of being able to set expenditures as their clientele prefers, per-student
expenditure in public schools is subsidized by taxation of private-school
students (maintaining here the assumption of majority choice of tax-
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36. Our warnings discussed in section 7.5 concerning eﬃciency measures apply here as well.expenditure policy).37 At the same time, as the voucher rises and students
are drawn into the private sector, political support for taxation to ﬁnance
private schools declines.38Due to the latter fact, the voucher need not be too
high before the public sector is eliminated. Importantly, the qualitative na-
ture of the equilibrium allocation—for example, the “diagonalized stratiﬁ-
cation across private schools”—remains with expenditure variation.
We now compare the voucher equilibrium to the neighborhood school-
ing equilibrium with neighborhood lines drawn to minimize schooling
costs. Hence, the neighborhood equilibrium has thirty-three equally sized
schools with allocation of types into schools as depicted in panel C of ﬁg-
ure 7.1. Private schools would be unlikely to enter without any voucher.
The panels of ﬁgure 7.7 provide information by student type on the ef-
fects of a voucher that covers average schooling cost. The upper panel shows
the welfare eﬀect as a percentage of income, equal to the (negative of the)
compensating variation from moving to the voucher equilibrium. Housing
prices everywhere drop to their construction cost (0) in the voucher equi-
librium. In the welfare calculation, we assume that households own the land
where they reside in the initial equilibrium, so the declines in housing prices
are irrelevant to welfare (i.e., households pay themselves less rent). The wel-
fare change is then entirely due to changes in school quality and payments
for school, with the latter being equal to any tuition after the voucher plus
tax changes. Tax changes are close to zero, since the tax required to ﬁnance
the voucher approximately equals the tax otherwise used to ﬁnance the pub-
lic school system. Thus, tax changes can be ignored in the discussion. Keep
in mind that tuition varies continuously with student ability and income in
each private school. Thus, although the average after-voucher tuition is (ap-
proximately) equal to zero, virtually every student will pay a net positive or
negative tuition in the voucher equilibrium.
Before discussing the welfare eﬀects, it is useful to describe the lower
panel of ﬁgure 7.7. This panel shows percentage changes in “normed
achievement,” which equals our achievement measure raised to the power
1/ (see equation [2] for achievement, a). Normed achievement can be given
several interpretations. First, its changes are proportional to changes in
school quality (with factor of proportionality 1/ ). Second, proportional
changes in normed achievement due to changes in school quality have
equivalent eﬀects on utility and achievement as the same proportional
change in own student ability. Third, related to the latter and given our cal-
ibration of the utility function, changes in normed achievement approxi-
mate changes in future earnings while employed.
266 Dennis Epple and Richard Romano
37. The expenditure ﬂexibility of private schools need not just imply relatively high expen-
diture levels. With our laissez-faire voucher policy, private schools may form that serve the
poorest students and use some voucher money to provide all students with fellowships. Of
course, the voucher policy might be modiﬁed to prevent this.
38. The eﬀects of this on voting equilibrium are analyzed in Epple and Romano (1996).The average welfare change from the voucher is only about $55. It is pos-
itive because the student sorting is Pareto eﬃcient in the voucher equilib-
rium. It is small in part because the neighborhood equilibrium has many
schools that also sort students by ability and income to the extent that in-
come and ability are correlated. For example, the average welfare gain in go-
ing from the equilibrium in panel A, which has little sorting, to the voucher
equilibrium is larger (although still only about $185). If private schools could
choose their expenditure levels, the average gain would be larger as well.
Although, on average, there are gains from moving to the voucher equi-
librium from the neighborhood school equilibrium, the eﬀects of the
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Fig. 7.7 A, Welfare eﬀects of voucher; B, achievement in private schools relative to
public schoolsvoucher are not distributed equally. Gains and losses for many are substan-
tial relative to the average eﬀect. Beginning at the lower right of panel A of
ﬁgure 7.7 and moving counterclockwise, we see that the welfare gains de-
cline and ultimately become negative. Students in the lower right triangle in
this panel gain the most as a percentage of their household income. These
are poor but relatively high-ability students. As one can see from panel B of
this ﬁgure, most of these students are in better schools in the voucher equi-
librium than in the neighborhood school equilibrium, because private
schools sort students on ability to the beneﬁt of higher-ability students.
Comparing these two panels, we see that some of these students (e.g., those
with low income and moderate ability) end up in lower-quality schools but
nonetheless have a welfare gain. They are above-average students in the
schools they attend, and they thus generate a positive peer externality. As a
result, they obtain a negative net tuition (i.e., a scholarship), yielding a ﬁ-
nancial gain suﬃciently large to oﬀset the monetary value to them of their
achievement loss.
More generally, tuition discounts are part of the gain to all relatively
high-ability students. However, inspection of the right portion of panel A
reveals that gains decline as income rises for a given ability. High-ability stu-
dents gain less from switching to the voucher equilibrium primarily because
they were in relatively high-quality neighborhood public schools.
Moving suﬃciently counterclockwise in the (b, y) plane, one ﬁnds welfare
losses. Thus, welfare losses accrue to relatively low-ability students. It is use-
ful to consider separately the impacts on high- and low-income students in
this low-ability group. As can be seen from panel B of ﬁgure 7.7, the high-
income, low-ability students are in higher-quality schools in the voucher
equilibrium. They nonetheless experience a welfare loss because they pay a
tuition premium in the voucher equilibrium to gain access to schools with
relatively high-quality peer group. Turning to low-income members of the
low-ability group, we see from panel B that they attend lower-quality
schools; they do not have high enough income to be willing to pay the tu-
ition premium to attend a higher-quality school. From panel B, we see, not
surprisingly, that they also experience a welfare loss. The poorest and low-
est-ability students end up in worse schools and have to pay a positive net
tuition.
Although the average welfare gain is positive, a majority equal to about
60 percent is worse oﬀ from the voucher. We emphasized earlier that our
analysis abstracts from potential productivity gains from increased compe-
tition for students (see Hoxby, chap. 8 in this volume). On top of the evi-
dence, there are several reasons to believe that competing private schools
will more eﬃciently provide education (for given student body) than will
schools in a neighborhood system. Most important, students attending a
low-productivity private school can switch to a new eﬃcient entrant at little
or no cost. Neighborhood public schools are much more insulated from
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a housing price premium. Households with children at diﬀerent educa-
tional levels would be frequently forced to switch schools for every child
when moving between neighborhoods, sometimes curtailing an incentive to
do so. It is true that land owners in a neighborhood have incentives to fos-
ter eﬃcient public schooling, but their control is limited at best. For these
reasons, we now examine how our welfare results vary with increases in the
relative productivity of private schools.
Speciﬁcally, we compute the average welfare change and the proportion
that gains from the voucher as a function of the relative productivity of
private versus public schools. Before discussing the results reported in the
panels of ﬁgure 7.8, we provide several pieces of information for interpret-
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Fig. 7.8 A, Percent who favor voucher as function of productivity of private relative
to public schools; B, per-household gain from voucher as function of productivity of
private relative to public schoolsing the productivity measure on the horizontal axis. This scale can be in-
terpreted as the percentage gain in earning power the student would ac-
quire in private school relative to the earning power the student would ac-
quire in an otherwise identical public school.39 Thus, a productivity value
of 2 implies that a student graduating from private school would earn 2 per-
cent more than if the student graduated from a public school that expended
the same resources and had the same peer group. With the available em-
pirical evidence, this productivity measure can also be related to diﬀer-
ences in achievement test scores. For example, Neal and Johnson (1996,
874) estimate that a 1 standard deviation improvement in the Armed
Forces Qualiﬁcation Test (AFQT) score translates into a 20 percent in-
crease in wages. Thus, 2 on our productivity scale would be comparable to
a test score improvement in private relative to public school of 1/10 of a
standard deviation in the AFQT. Elsewhere in this volume, Peterson et al.
(chap. 4) estimate that voucher experiments have improved student test
scores by about 1/3 of a standard deviation. Assuming the Neal-Johnson
coeﬃcient on test scores applies to the tests used in the voucher experi-
ments, the test score improvement in the voucher experiments would imply
a value of roughly 6 on our productivity scale. Hoxby (2000a) estimates
that a 1 standard deviation increase in her measure of public school choice
would increase income at age thirty-two by 4 percent, a value of 4 on our
productivity scale.40
Given the preceding interpretations of the horizontal axis in ﬁgure 7.8,
we now turn to discussion of the results reported in those ﬁgures. The bot-
tom panel translates a given percentage diﬀerential in earning power into
an average annual household dollar gain from introducing the voucher. For
example, a 4 percent diﬀerential in productivity between private and public
schools translates into a diﬀerence in average household earning power of
about $1,000 in 1990 dollars. The upper panel reports the proportion that
gains from the voucher. With a productivity value of 2, a narrow majority
of the population gains from the voucher. With a value of 4, roughly 80 per-
cent of the population gains from the voucher. If relative productivity val-
ues exceed about 6, then everyone is better oﬀ in the voucher equilibrium.
The reader must, again, keep in mind that our predictions about the
eﬀects of a voucher depend on the particular voucher policy. Three types of
variations in the voucher policy analyzed here have been considered by pol-
icymakers and enacted in some instances. First, we have analyzed a univer-
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39. These calculations use the normed-achievement function previously discussed and the
fact that normed achievement can be interpreted as future earnings, the latter implied by our
calibration strategy. We can then multiply the achievement function in public schools by a con-
stant greater than 1 to obtain an achievement function for private schools that conforms to a
given percentage gain in earning power.
40. In table 4, Hoxby (2000a, 1227) reports that a regression of ln(income) on her school
choice measure yields a coeﬃcient of 0.151. A standard deviation of her school choice mea-
sure is 0.27. Multiplying the preceding two numbers yields the percentage reported in the text.sal voucher of suﬃcient magnitude to cover average schooling cost, leading
to elimination of the public sector. Universal vouchers that cover only part
of schooling cost would be taken up only by those with suﬃciently high de-
mand for educational quality, with the rest still attending public schools.
Nechyba analyzes such partial vouchers in a multidistrict setting in his
chapter of this volume. He shows that (many) households taking up vouch-
ers will relocate to districts with lower housing prices, with important local
ﬁscal externalities on remaining public schools. In our single-district envi-
ronment, partial vouchers would likewise lead to movement to initially
poorer neighborhoods, but without such ﬁscal externalities since public
school ﬁnance is not localized in our case. See Epple and Romano (1998,
1999) for analysis of partial vouchers in a single-district case with homoge-
neous public schools (e.g., due to public school choice).
Rather than being universally available, vouchers might be targeted to
particular types of students. Nechyba (chap. 5 in this volume) also analyzes
targeting to poor districts. Fernández and Rogerson (chap. 6 in this volume)
examine the political economy of means- (income-) tested vouchers in their
chapter. The three privately funded voucher programs evaluated in Peterson
et al. (chap. 4 in this volume) are all targeted to low-income students (and
are partial vouchers). Figlio and Page (chap. 2 in this volume) argue that
school accountability plans that accurately measure school productivity
and that make vouchers available to students in low-productivity schools
will poorly target vouchers to the most disadvantaged. In Epple and Ro-
mano (1999), we ask whether appropriately targeted vouchers might yield
beneﬁts to everyone by maintaining or improving upon status quo stratiﬁ-
cation, while increasing productivity by injecting private-school competi-
tion into the education system.
The answer to the latter question depends on a third element of voucher
policies. Rather than a laissez-faire voucher policy, participating private
schools might face regulations, most importantly regarding their admission
or tuition policies. The Florida voucher program, for example, requires par-
ticipating private schools to accept exactly the voucher for tuition and to ac-
cept every voucher-ﬁnanced student (or, if capacity-constrained, to admit
from the pool of voucher-ﬁnanced students with equal probabilities). As-
suming enforceability of such regulations (a serious concern), they can be
highly relevant to the eﬀects of voucher system. In Epple and Romano
(1999), we show that a laissez-faire voucher whose magnitude varies with
student ability (from which the peer externality derives) will continue to
lead to a highly stratiﬁed equilibrium. We show further, however, that a
voucher properly targeted to ability combined with a requirement on par-
ticipating schools to take exactly the voucher for tuition for any students the
school chooses to admit can lead to signiﬁcant private school entry and
thus productivity gains, without signiﬁcant eﬀect on stratiﬁcation. Every-
one gains here.
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Many models of multijurisdictional equilibrium are structured so that
diﬀerences in tax and expenditure policies across jurisdictions are the only
force leading to stratiﬁcation of population across jurisdictions. These
models have been quite fruitful in studying a variety of policy issues related
to state and local government ﬁnance. In investigating school ﬁnance pol-
icy issues, it is natural to turn to those models to understand the eﬀects of
changing the structure of school ﬁnance. In geographic areas in which stu-
dents are served by a single school in each district, these models should give
reasonable guidance, particularly in studying ﬁnance policies that entail
only partial equalization across jurisdictions.
Unfortunately, these conditions are almost never met. As we noted in sec-
tion 7.1, the vast majority of children in the United States go to school in
multischool districts. Central-city districts are virtually all multischool dis-
tricts. Thus, many students go to school in districts that have dozens of
schools. The second diﬃculty with using the traditional model to study
school policy is that it gives either no predictions or incorrect predictions in
cases where there is full equalization of expenditure per student or in the
study of intradistrict public school choice. The diﬃculty lies in the common
assumption that stratiﬁcation of the population across schools is driven by
expenditure diﬀerences and that stratiﬁcation does not arise when expendi-
tures are equalized.
Even a cursory look at the stratiﬁcation of households across neighbor-
hood schools in large urban districts is suﬃcient to put to rest the notion
that there is no stratiﬁcation among schools in a district when expenditures
are equalized. We have shown in this paper that there is likely to be little or
no change in stratiﬁcation when expenditures are equalized in neighbor-
hood school systems. School quality diﬀerences arising from peer eﬀects
give rise to housing price diﬀerentials across neighborhoods that are suﬃ-
cient to sustain stratiﬁcation. Thus, although expenditure equalization may
lead to some reduction of school quality diﬀerences, equalization of school
quality will generally not arise when expenditures per student are equalized.
Our paper provides insights into public school choice programs and
oﬀers a foundation for addressing many issues related to public school
choice. We noted earlier that, although many states have interdistrict school
choice programs, few students participate in such programs. This is as our
model would predict, because districts that are prospective recipients of
choice students will resist accepting such students. To see why, consider two
districts, D1 and D2, and a student from D1 who wishes to attend school in
D2. For simplicity, suppose that each district has only one school. It is easy
to see that D2 will resist if the funding the student brings from D1 is less
than the expenditure per student in D2. Suppose then that the choice pro-
gram compensates for any such funding disparities. Our model predicts
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dents will wish to transfer from schools with low average peer ability to
those with high average peer ability. The clientele of the prospective recipi-
ent school will resist accepting such students since, on average, they will be
of lower peer ability than the incumbent students. In practice, in states
where district participation in interdistrict choice programs is voluntary,
high-income districts typically opt out. In states where such formal opting
out is not permitted, de facto opting out is nonetheless likely to occur, as
prospective recipient districts give priority to local residents and then
“ﬁnd” that they have little or no excess capacity to serve students from out-
side the district.
Of course, the same incentives to resist choice students arise within dis-
tricts. Within-district programs often tackle this resistance by requiring
schools to select at random from their applicant list if they are oversub-
scribed. Of course, a recipient school may still be less welcoming to students
from outside the neighborhood than to students from inside the neighbor-
hood, but such informal resistance is likely to be muted if district adminis-
trators are suﬃciently committed to the choice program. Students exercis-
ing choice may then ﬁnd that the gain in school quality is suﬃcient to justify
living with any residual resistance. Such resistance may, however, be similar
to the role of our transportation cost variable, T, in discouraging students
from the lowest-income households from attending a higher-quality choice
school.
Our model points to potential unintended consequences of public school
choice programs. For example, suppose, again, that there are two districts,
D1 and D2. Suppose now that D1 has two neighborhood schools, A and B,
and D2 has one school, C. For simplicity, let the three schools be of equal
size. Suppose that low- and high-income students are in district D1, and
middle-income districts are in D2. Speciﬁcally, let the attendees of A be low-
income students, with B serving high-income students, and C serving
middle-income students. Thus, the ordering of school qualities is A, C, B.
How could such an allocation be an equilibrium? One could easily con-
struct realistic examples in which tax base per student in D1 would be com-
parable to tax base per student in D2, so that equilibrium would be charac-
terized by little diﬀerence in spending per student in the two districts. With
E[b|y] increasing in y, the ordering of school qualities A, C, B would then
primarily reﬂect diﬀerences in peer qualities.
Beginning with such an equilibrium, consider the eﬀect of introducing a
frictionless intradistrict choice program in D1. What are the possible equi-
libria with this choice program? The equalization of peer qualities in D1
means that there will no longer be stratiﬁcation within districts. There will,
however, be stratiﬁcation across districts. Thus, one possible equilibrium is
that the high-income households will remain in D1, middle-income house-
holds will move to D1, and the poor will move to D2. The other possible
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middle-income households will move to D1.41What are the eﬀects on school
quality? In the ﬁrst case, students in poor households receive a worse educa-
tion after introduction of the choice program. They face the same peer qual-
ity as before the change and reside in a district where the tax base is lower
than in the original equilibrium. In addition, the pivotal voter is poorer than
in the original equilibrium, so there will be a decline in spending due both to
the lower tax base and to the lower willingness of the pivotal voter to tax in
support of education. Middle-income students will probably gain because
they move to a district with higher average tax base and higher average peer
quality. The eﬀect on high-income students is ambiguous, because their dis-
trict’s tax base per student rises but choice causes the quality of peer students
to fall. In the second case, the eﬀect of the change on students in low-income
households is ambiguous, depending on whether peer eﬀects or expenditure
eﬀects are more important. Students in high-income households will receive
higher-quality education than before the change, and students in middle-
income households will receive lower-quality education.
The preceding discussion illustrates the potential of our model for antic-
ipating consequences of public school choice programs.42 Because choice
programs have been undertaken by a number of central-city districts, the
possibilities raised in this example cannot be easily dismissed. Metropolitan
areas typically contain suburban districts that have lower average income
than average income in the wealthiest central-city neighborhoods. Thus,
there is a very real possibility that introduction of choice programs in cen-
tral-city districts will induce exodus from the city by the high-income house-
holds and entry by middle-income households. Of course, a central-city dis-
trict may nonetheless decide that the choice program should be undertaken.
The point of the example is to illustrate that our model provides a vehicle for
thinking through the likely consequences of such policy changes.
Appendix
The Existence and Multiplicity of Diﬀerentiated
Equilibria in the Neighborhood Model
Proposition A1 identiﬁes the multiplicity of equilibria that arise in the
neighborhood schooling model with N neighborhoods. It also proves exis-
tence of such equilibria, thus proving part (a) of proposition 2.
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41. If one thinks of the multischool district as a central city, then the second is the more likely
outcome, because forces not in our model lead the poor to live in cities (Glaeser, Kahn, and
Rappoport 2000).
42. Incorporating a private schooling sector is obviously of interest, an extension that we are
currently pursuing.P A1. Divide the N neighborhoods into k (  N) sets, each set
consisting of all neighborhoods having the same housing capacity. Let mi, i  
1, 2, . . . , k, equal the number of neighborhoods in set i. The maximum num-
ber of neighborhoods/schools having diﬀerent peer groups in an equilibrium
equals N. There are #   N!/(m1!   m2!    mk!) distinct such equilibria.
P. Obviously, N is the maximum number of diﬀerent school quali-
ties that is feasible in an equilibrium. The number of distinct ways neigh-
borhoods can be ordered by their housing capacities is #. We now show
each distinct order is consistent with an equilibrium having N diﬀerent
school qualities by construction. Refer to figure 7.3 for an example. (Note
that figure 7.3 has three neighborhoods but not necessarily with distinct
housing capacities [population sizes], the latter depending on f(b, y).)
Take any order of neighborhoods and number them 1, 2, . . . , N. Let F y(y)
denote the marginal c.d.f. of y in the population. Set y0   ym and ﬁnd yi, i  
1, 2, . . . , N – 1, such that F y(yi) – F y(yi–1) equals the land capacity of neigh-
borhood i. Recalling that we normalized the population to 1 and also set-
ting the aggregate housing capacity equal to 1, it is clear that the ordering
of neighborhoods results in a unique vector (y1, y2, ...yN–1). These delin-
eate the equilibrium partition. Set yN   yx, and let
 i     ;
denote the implied peer quality measures. Since E[b|y] is increasing,  1   2
  ...      N. Then, since Xi is constant across neighborhoods, the qis also
ascend. Let pi denote the housing price in neighborhood i, and set p1   c.
Find pi, i   2, 3, . . . , N, recursively from
U[yi 1(1   t)   pi, a(qi, b)]   U[yi 1(1   t)   pi 1, a(qi 1, b)],
noting that equation (3) implies unique solutions independent of b. Since
qi   qi–1, pi   pi–1. By equation (1) the assigned residential choices are util-
ity maximizing, and the housing markets clear by construction. We have
then described an equilibrium consistent with the given ordering of neigh-
borhoods. A distinct equilibrium can be so constructed from each of the
distinct orderings.
Voting Equilibrium
To solve for voting equilibrium, we follow the same methodology em-
ployed in Epple and Romer (1991). Take as given the household’s residence
and consider the preference mapping in the (X,t) plane for Cobb-Douglas
utility function (see equation [2]). An indiﬀerence curve is deﬁned: U(X, t;
y, p, b,  )   constant. Using equation (2), it is straightforward to conﬁrm
the following:
 yi
yi 1E[by]   [ bx
bm f(b, y)db]dy











Schools, Choice, and the Distribution of Educational Beneﬁts 275L1.(a) Indiﬀerence curves in the (X, t) plane are upward sloping and
concave, with lower (southeasterly) indiﬀerence curves corresponding to
higher utility. (b) The indiﬀerence curve mapping is independent of b and  ,
depending only on y/p and  . (c) As we look across households, the slope of in-
diﬀerence curves through any point (X, t) increases with y/p. Hence, any pair
of indiﬀerence curves cross once at most.
Lemma 1 implies that households with higher y/p have a stronger prefer-
ence for (X, t) in the following sense. If a household is indiﬀerent to choices
(X2, t2) and (X1, t1) where X2   X1 and t2   t1, then all households with
higher (lower) y/p strictly prefer point (X2, t2) (point [X1, t1]) over the alter-
native. The latter can be veriﬁed using lemma 1 by drawing indiﬀerence
curves in the (X, t) plane (see ﬁgure 7A.1 for example). It also follows that,
whether or not the feasible choice set of (X, t) values voters face is well be-
haved (e.g., convex):
L 2. A most preferred choice of a voter with median preference (i.e.,
median y/p) from the feasible choice set is a majority voting equilibrium. Only
a most-preferred choice of a voter with median preference is a voting equilib-
rium if the density of the preference parameter y/p is positive in the vicinity of
the median.
P. The argument follows the graphic technique of Epple and Romer
(1991), and is presented here for the reader’s convenience. Refer to ﬁgure
7A.1 where Umed is an indiﬀerence curve of a voter with median preference,
and suppose point (X∗, t∗) is a most-preferred choice of this voter in the fea-
sible choice set (not shown). We argue first that no feasible points in the
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Fig. 7A.1 Illustration of proof of lemma 2(X, t) plane are majority preferred to (X∗, t∗), establishing it is an equilib-
rium point. The indiﬀerence curve Umed and point (X∗, t∗) partitions the
(X, t) plane into four regions. No points below Umedare feasible choices, be-
cause this would contradict the median voter’s preference for (X∗, t∗). Point
(X∗, t∗) is preferred unanimously over all points in the rectangle with lower
right-hand corner at (X∗, t∗). Region I (see ﬁgure 7A.1) is made up of points
above and including Umed and with X   X∗ (e.g., point A). Since those with
below-median preferences have flatter indiﬀerence curves through point
(X∗, t∗)—for example, Umedin ﬁgure 7A.1—they prefer (X∗, t∗) to all points
in region I. Since the median voter prefers (X∗, t∗) or is indiﬀerent (i.e., if
the alternative point is on Umed), at least a weak majority prefers (X∗, t∗).
By an analogous argument, (X∗, t∗) is not defeated by any points in re-
gion II. We have established that any most-preferred point of a voter with
median preference is a majority voting equilibrium.
Any most-preferred point of the median voter is preferred by a strict ma-
jority over any other feasible point assuming a positive density of types in
the vicinity of the median. A positive measure of households with y/pin the
vicinity of y/p of the median voter will share the latter’s strict preference, as
will all those with lower or higher y/p(or both). Hence, only most-preferred
points of a voter with median preference are voting equilibria.
Lemma 2 points toward two potential cases of multiple equilibria. One
has a gap in the density of the preference parameter at the 50th percentile
and two median preference voters with distinct preferences. The other has
multiple most-preferred points of a unique median preference voter. The
former is ruled out by the (reasonable) parameter restriction




and the latter will not arise in our model.
Applying lemma 2 to the neighborhood schooling case with no trans-
portation cost and using equation (A1), one ﬁnds the pivotal voter in equa-
tion (7) of the text. For the case of choice with friction, it is straightforward
to identify three exhaustive cases that identify income yp2 of a pivotal voter:
(A2) For y∗ deﬁned in F y(y∗)   F y(yI)   0.5,
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Existence of Equilibrium in the Two-Jurisdiction Model
PA2.A suﬃcient condition for existence of diﬀerentiated equi-
librium is








































and  i and y  i are calculated assuming income stratiﬁcation with y1   ymed (re-
call equation [5]). Given that equation (A6) is satisﬁed and setting p1   c,
equilibrium (with diﬀerentiated schools) is unique. Two of many suﬀcient con-
ditions for satisfaction of equation (A6) are (a) c suﬃciently low; or (b)   
ymed/yq3.
P. To show existence, we must show equations (15)–(17) have a so-
lution (t1, t2, p1, p2) with pi   c, i   1, 2, and consistent with the residen-
tial preferences of proposition 6. Clearance of housing markets will be im-
plied. We show equation (A6) implies an equilibrium exists with p1   c. Set
p1   c, substitute for p1 in equation (15), and substitute equations (15) and
(16) into equation (17):






























Using yq3   ymed, observe that H (p2)   0 for p2 such that H(p2)   0, and
H(p2) ↓ 0 as p2 rises. Note that the left-hand side of the inequality in condi-
tion (A6) is H(c). The right-hand side of the inequality (A6) is positive since
it has the same sign as the utility of median-income households when p1  
c. It follows that, given equation (A6), a unique p2 satisfying equation (A7)
exists. Note, too, that this p2   c. Hence, one can ﬁnd a solution to equa-
tions (15)–(17) with pi   c, i   1, 2.
To show existence, it remains to be conﬁrmed that the residential choices
associated with the presumed allocation are actually optimal. This requires
that   (deﬁned in the proof of proposition 6) is increasing in y, or
(A8) (1   t2)q2   (1   t1)q1.








































2   → p2(1   t1)   p1(1   t2).
278 Dennis Epple and Richard RomanoSubstitute from equations (15) and (16) and again rewrite the condition:













Since yq3   yq1, p2   p1 is suﬃcient for satisfaction of equation (A10). We
have shown p2 exceeds p1   c, completing the proof of existence.
We have already shown uniqueness given p1   c. Suﬃciency of condition
(a) for equation (A6) uses   1. The left-hand side of the inequality (A6)
converges to ymed as c ↓ 0, and the right-hand side converges to  ymed. To
show condition (b), let g(y) denote the expression on the left-hand side of
the inequality (A6) where y   y q3. With this notation, the inequality (A6) is
g(yq3)    g(yq1). It follows that the inequality is satisﬁed if g(y) is an in-
creasing function over y   [yq1, yq3]. After straightforward manipulation
one obtains
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Condition (b) is suﬃcient for g  0 in this range, proving the result.
Since equation (A6) involves nine parameters (counting  1/ 2as one), it is
not particularly intuitive. However, condition (A6) is easily satisﬁed, for ex-
ample, as in the two suﬃcient conditions for its satisfaction. One can see by
inspection that if the construction cost c of a house is suﬃciently low equa-
tion (A6) will be satisﬁed. Roughly, the suﬃcient conditions (and other
suﬃcient conditions) ensure that voting eﬀects do not contradict the sorting
implications of peer eﬀects. For example, as cdeclines toward zero, t2 t1is
implied (use equations [15] and [16] and that p1 c), and tax eﬀects reinforce
income sorting. Note also that as   declines, it is more likely that equation
(A6) will be satisﬁed. Hence, high correlation of (y, b), implying relatively
low  1/ 2, favors existence of stratiﬁed equilibrium. Moreover, equation (A6)
is not necessary for existence of equilibrium. Absent satisfaction of equa-
tion (A6), p1   p2 in an equilibrium. It appears that this is possible (but we
have not worked out any such examples). Such an equilibrium would have a
much higher tax rate in neighborhood 2 than in neighborhood 1, reﬂecting
a relatively high yq3, and such that a lower housing price in neighborhood 2
is necessary to keep the median-income household indiﬀerent to residence.
An Interjurisdictional Choice Policy
The model is the same as in section 7.4.3 of the text except for the school
choice policy. Following residential choice, households commit to attend
school in their own neighborhood or the other one. Every household then
votes for the tax-expenditure pair with those committed to the same school,
and with tax base consisting of that school’s households. Hence, those that
attend a school comprise a jurisdiction independent of their residences. We
assume transportation costs are negligible (zero).
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tionless choice across two neighborhoods of one jurisdiction. Since school
and thus jurisdictional membership is independent of the ﬁrst-stage resi-
dential choice, housing prices must be the same in the two neighborhoods.
Hence, p2   p1   c, as we have argued earlier that p1   c is a sensible con-
vention.
The diﬀerence in utility if school and jurisdiction 2 are selected from the
utility if school and jurisdiction 1 are selected is given by
(A11)     b {[y(1   t2)   c]q2   [y(1   t1)   c]q1}
  b {[(1   t2)q2   (1   t1)q1]y   c(q2   q1)}.
Assuming q2 q1with no loss in generality, we see using equation (A11) that
equilibrium has either (a) q2   q1; t2   t1; and income stratiﬁcation; (b) q2  
q1;  t2   t1; and all households indiﬀerent to their school/jurisdictional
choice. If q2   q1, then income stratiﬁcation is implied by the linearity of  
in y. For this case, if not t2 t1, then school/jurisdiction 2 would be preferred
by all. We emphasize that the conditions in (a) are merely selected necessary
conditions for a stratiﬁed equilibrium; they are not suﬃcient. If q2   q1 and
t2   t1, then equation (A11) would imply that everyone prefers the school/
jurisdiction with lower tax rate. (If everyone were in one school, then a rich
type with a bright child would be better oﬀ attending his own school.)
For realistic parameterizations, stratiﬁed equilibrium will not exist. We
show why with some intuitive arguments, in lieu of a (more lengthy) com-
putational analysis. Assume that there is a stratiﬁed equilibrium. Then q2
  q1 because the rich school/jurisdiction has a better peer group and a
wealthier tax base (t2   t1 is a necessary condition, recall). Such an equi-
librium would have an indiﬀerent household (income) as well, for whom
equation (A11) would vanish. However, it is very diﬃcult to satisfy all these
conditions. The reason is that the tax rate that will be selected in equilib-
rium by the rich will not typically be high enough to keep out the poorer
types, and there is no longer a housing price diﬀerential that can serve as a
deterrent.
To see this, ﬁrst suppose that cis small. Then the equilibrium tax rates will
hardly diﬀer. Equation (9) in the text describes the tax rate in each jurisdic-
tion if yp1 is replaced by the median income in the jurisdiction. As c → 0, t1
→ t2 for any allocation, and no indiﬀerent household can exist. An analo-
gous argument precludes stratiﬁed equilibrium as   → 0.
Another way to see the diﬃculty in obtaining a stratiﬁed equilibrium is
by a graphic analysis. Assume initially that E[b|y] is invariant to y. We will
show that it is quite diﬃcult to obtain a stratiﬁed equilibrium and then show
that E[b|y] that increases in y makes it more diﬃcult.
Assuming a stratiﬁed equilibrium, ﬁgure 7A.2 depicts in the (X, t) plane
a “voting indiﬀerence curve” of the pivotal voter in the poor school/juris-
280 Dennis Epple and Richard Romanodiction (Up1), an indiﬀerence curve of the type indiﬀerent between schools
(UI), and the budget constraints of the two schools/jurisdictions. (The indi-
ﬀerence curves are those discussed in and preceding lemma 1.) E1shows the
equilibrium expenditure per student and tax rate in school/jurisdiction 1.
The indiﬀerent household has indiﬀerence curve through E1 that is steeper
than is the pivotal voter’s because the former type has higher income (see
lemma 1). (Note that in the extreme of c   0, the indiﬀerence mappings of
all types would be the same, again precluding equilibrium, as we will see
momentarily.) Equilibrium in school/jurisdiction 2 would have to be at
point E2 so that “type I” is indiﬀerent. Hence, the indiﬀerence curve of the
pivotal voter in school/jurisdiction 2 (i.e., the median-income type there)
would need to be tangent to X2   ty  2 at E2. This indicates that preferences
for X need to rise precipitously with income to obtain such an equilibrium.
If, for example,   is small, then this will not occur.
If we now let E[b|y] increase with y, then the diﬃculty is exacerbated.
The preference mappings are unchanged (due to the Cobb-Douglas speci-
ﬁcation), but the values of utility are higher in jurisdiction 2 than in juris-
diction 1. Utility at E2 in school 2 is then higher than utility at E1 in school
1 for type I. This implies that the equilibrium point in jurisdiction 2 is higher
up X2   t2y  2 than E2.
Given that equilibrium of type (a) above does not exist, then equilibrium
is of type (b). In such an equilibrium, everyone is indiﬀerent to residential
and school/jurisdictional choice. Hence, assume types randomize over their
choices, all with the same probabilities. This implies schools and jurisdic-
tions that are homogeneous: That is, each school’s distribution of types is
the same as the population distribution. The outcome is the same as with
frictionless choice and one jurisdiction.
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Fig. 7A.2 Illustration of analysis of interjurisdictional choice policyProof of Proposition 9
Proposition 9 is essentially an application of results in Epple and Ro-
mano (1998, 1999). Here we sketch proofs for the reader’s convenience.
A. This is the “strict hierarchy result” in the papers just cited, developed
assuming ﬁxed expenditures across schools in Epple and Romano (1998)
and extended to variation in expenditure in Epple and Romano (1999). The
proof proceeds as follows. Assume q1   q2 and show a Pareto improvement
is feasible. First show that q1   q2 implies X1   X2 and  1    2 using quasi-
concavity of q(X,  ). If, say,  2    1, then X2   X1 and q /qx is higher in
school 1 than in school 2. Using proposition 8 and the deﬁnition of SMCi,
it is implied that there is an ability threshold B, such that all types with b  
( ) B would choose to attend school 1(2). This contradicts  2    1.
Having established that q1   q2 implies X1   X2 and  1    2, we can re-
gard the schools as having homogeneous student bodies (with respect to
both band y). Then it is shown that one can engender a Pareto improvement
by having the schools exchange students in a particular way that leads one
school to be of higher quality, with more able and also richer students, and
the opposite for the other school. The Pareto improvement does not require
changes in X1 or X2. Mathematically, this is somewhat involved, since it re-
lies on second-order eﬀects (as ﬁrst-order eﬀects vanish), so we refer the
reader to the proof of proposition 1 in Epple and Romano (1998). The in-
tuition is, however, not too complicated: Those in the improved school are
obviously better oﬀ. Those in the school that has deteriorated are better oﬀ
because the contribution to costs of the departed students is relatively low
due to their high abilities and thus low SMC, and the reduced quality is of
relatively low “cost” because the student body becomes relatively poor and
cares less about quality.
B. Given q2   q1, income stratiﬁcation follows by equation (1) and be-
cause prices depend only on student ability (see equation [19] in the text).
That is, for any given ability, if there is a household indiﬀerent to the schools
when ri   SMCi, i,   1, 2, then all types having higher (lower) income
strictly prefer school 2 (1). (If there is no indiﬀerent type, then all types with
that ability attend one of the two schools.)
The indiﬀerent set in equation (22) is found simply by equating utilities
given ri   SMCi and using the deﬁnition of  i.
C. Equation (23) is found from equation (20) and the analogue for X2,
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Then substitute equation (A12) into equation (20) and rearrange, while not-
ing that the density of types in school 1 is given by Af/∫∫Afdbdy. X2 is found
analogously.
The result in equation (24) is found by substituting equation (23) into
equation (A13).
D, E. These are eﬃciently proved together. Note from equation (22) that
the boundary locus in the (b, y) plane is linear (see ﬁgure 7.6 for an ex-
ample), so that, given we have established income stratiﬁcation, ability
stratiﬁcation corresponds to a downward-sloping boundary locus. Suppose
this locus is not downward sloping. Then, for E[b|y] constant in y,  2    1.
Hence, q2 q1implies X2 X1. This implies  2   1, which by equation (22)
implies a downward-sloping boundary locus—a contradiction.
Hence, the boundary locus isdownward sloping, obviously also implying
 2    1.
F.  iqi    /  Xi
1   i
 –1. By part E of this proposition and equation (22),
 2q2   1q1. Using part D of this proposition, then, X2 X1whenever   1.
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